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The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of Postmodern
Administrative Law
Karl-Heinz Ladeur *

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The discussion on “international administrative law” has been established – following the logic
of its object – as an international topic for quite some time. However, this evolution does not
exclude the differentiation of, so to speak, regional and methodologically approaches within
the global network of legal research: in the US, one can observe a focus on “global
administrative law” at the law faculty of NYU – and this shift of the accent to “global” instead of
“international administrative law” is not without consequences. The focus is more on case
studies and methodological questions. 1 This approach corresponds with the ideas of an Italian
group of researchers, which has been set up at Viterbo, 2 and with other individual contributors
to the international discussion. In as far as one can already talk about an established field of
research in Germany, one can observe a different focus on a rather traditional systematic
differentiation of certain “matters” which are undergoing a process of internationalisation.3 In
the following, an approach will be developed which tries to build a bridge between global and
domestic administrative law. It will be shown that there is a close link between the evolution of
administrative law in postmodernity and the emergence of global administrative law, and that
the basic institutions of administrative law are products of the autonomous rationality of
administration. This sheds new light on the questions of both the accountability and the
legitimation of transnational global networks.

*

The author is professor emeritus of public law at the University of Hamburg, as of 2008 he is Distinguished
Bremen Professor at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Bremen (Germany); from 1994
to 2002 he was professor at the law department of the European University Institute, Florence (Italy). Email: KarlHeinz Ladeur <karl-heinz.ladeur@jura.uni-hamburg.de>
1

See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, (68 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 15 (2005); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles
and Values”, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 187 (2006); Jean-Bernard Auby, LA
GLOBALISATION. LE DROIT ET L’ETAT, 2nd ed., 2010.
2
3

www.ricercaitaliana.it/prin/unita

See the contributions in: INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (Christoph Möllers & Andreas Voßkuhle, eds)
2007).
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II. THE AUTOPOIESIS OF LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW

A. NO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BEYOND DELEGATION OF POWER? THE SELF-GENERATIVE FUNCTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
In systems theory, the focus of the observation of the legal system shifts from norms to
decision-making, i.e., the legal system is regarded as being composed of decisions, not of
persons and not of norms as the object of application to specific cases. At least, this is
constitutive of the difference between centre (decisions) and periphery (legislation) of the legal
system. This may sound counter-intuitive to traditional approaches to law, and it may not do
sufficient justice to the practice of contracting4 and other transactions, which do not take on
the form of a binding decision.5 However, this discussion will not be taken up here. The
autopoietic construction of the legal system as processing from decision to decision is opposed
to a more traditional conception of decision-making as deriving (specific) decisions for cases
from a (general) norm which is integrated in a whole system of legal rules and – super-imposed
at this level of norms – a set of principles which integrate the law in a system. For the purposes
of this article, the difference between continental European and Anglo-American law will be left
aside, because, as will be shown later, the blind spot of the most diffused approaches to the
understanding of the self-transformation of the legal system that the law undergoes under the
pressure of the evolution of modern society is the same in both traditions. The focus of the
following assumption is more on the inevitable autonomy of not only judicial, but also
administrative, decision-making, which allows for a recognition of the creative normative
function of the processing of administrative decision-making.6 The traditional conception tends
to reduce the creative norm-generating role beyond the legislative authority to the judiciary
whereas the this normative role of the administration is left in the shadow. Modern
4

See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Contracting State, 45 UNIVERSITY OF LOS ANGELES LAW
REVIEW, 1 (1998); ead., The Contracting State, 28 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 155 (2001), (arguing
that the rise of the contract in administrative action is a sign of a general transformation towards a more open
type of “governance” and not a symptom of decline of democratic legitimation of administrative agencies); Alfred
A. Aman jr., Globalization, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UNIVERSITY OF LOS ANGELES LAW
REVIEW,p. 1687 (2002); for a critique, see Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the “Contracting
State”, 28 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 215 (2001), (emphasising the flexibility that was already
inherent in traditional administrative law); for the far advanced practices of the contracting state in the UK, see
Peter Vincent-Jones, THE NEW CONTRACTING STATE: REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
5

See in a theoretical perspective Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Das subjektive Recht als Medium der Selbstransformation des
Rechts and Gerechtigkeit als deren Parasit, p. 109 & 114 et seq., in: ZUR (UN-) MÖGLICHKEIT EINER
GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE DER GERECHTIGKEIT (Gunther Teubner, ed., 2008).
6

Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era
1801-1829,116 YALE LAW REVIEW 1636 (2007).
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administrative law cannot, of course, deny a creative element that is termed “discretion”,
although this leeway for administrative autonomy is hidden within the idea of a legislative
delegation of power. 7
“Delegation” includes the assumption that the domain of options within which the “delegated”
power of administrative decision-makers can develop is defined by the legislator. However,
global administrative law is confronted with the design of forms, instruments and procedures
beyond the established rules of general administrative law and its inherent structuring
function.8 As will be shown in more detail below, the fundamental forms and components of
general administrative law have not been developed by the legislator nor by the judiciary
(which has made some of its implicit rules explicit), but by an experimental search process of
the administration itself. 9 The ensuing “reverse” process of norm-generation – from
administrative experimental rule generation to explicit stabilisation through courts and finally
through legislation – appears to be incompatible with the traditional understanding of the
separation of powers.
This unavoidable self-generative element of the legal system is due to the fact that we have to
distinguish- from explicit rule-making - an evolutionary process of self-transformation of (not
only administrative) law, which is due to the dynamic of society at large, including its
knowledge basis and the social norms and expectations that try to cope with the societal
complexity. As will be discussed later, the basic forms of both administrative and private law
are not created by the legislator, but are, instead, stabilised ex post by the formulation of
historical “versions” in the legislative process which correspond to a societal challenge which is
managed - in a first step - by administrative or judicial decision-makers (the latter in private
law).

7

See only the overview in Francesca Bignami, The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution:
Lessons for European Community Rule-Making from the United States, Jean Monnet Center for International and
Regional Economic Law and Justice, New York University, 1999; for a critique see Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal
Administration and Administrative Law of the Gilded Age, 119 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1362, 1377 et seq. (2010).
8
9

See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, DAS ALLGEMEINE VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS ORDNUNGSIDEE (2d ed., 2004).

The role of courts in the development of general administrative law is overstated when the latter is reduced to
judge-made law, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW23 (2009): from the absence of a legislative delegation of power to
administrative deciders does not follow a supplementary norm generating role of courts alone, administration
itself has to be regarded as the creator of the instruments and forms of administrative law; the role of the judges
consisted rather in the doctrinal stabilisation of the institutions of general administrative law, for the role of
doctrine in general administrative law see Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS
nd
ORDNUNGSIDEE ( 2 ed., 2006) 3 et seq. and Jens Kersten & Sophie-Charlotte Lenski, Die Entwicklungsfunktion des
Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts, 42 DIE VERWALTUNG 503 (2009); Oliver Lepsius, Themen der
Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, 1, 27, in:, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE (Matthias Jestaedt & id. , eds., 2008) . For
a critique of simplistic “functionalist” conception of legislation as the (generative) democratic will see Martin
Loughlin, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 60 (2003); id., WHAT IS PUBLIC LAW?, 151 et seq. (2003).
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Neither administrative nor private law can be understood and practiced without the
observation of social norms and cognitive assumptions of normality. The legal system is linked
permanently to the “collective knowledge” of society 10 and the basic forms of attribution of
responsibility: in modernity, we can first observe the emergence of the “society of
individuals”, 11 which provokes the rise of a new administrative law based upon individual
decisions. The next stage of the evolution of administrative law is characterised by the new
paradigms derived from the requirements of the “society of organisations” and its
consequences (such as planning law, the forms of the welfare state, etc.) The forms and
procedures of this new stage of administrative law had to be found in an experimental process
first, and could afterwards be integrated in new types of laws and legal procedures of decisionmaking. We are now confronted with a new change of paradigm, the rise of the “network
society”, which, again, demands new administrative forms and procedures for decision-making
in conditions of increasing complexity. With Jerry L. Mashaw, one might describe the evolution
of administrative law as underlying a “cyclical oscillation between categorical and contextual
norms”. 12 Administrative law is deeply characterised by paradigmatic transformations which
are initiated by administrative decision-makers in experimental processes and finally stabilised
by court practice and the legislator.
The hypothesis which underlies the following reflections is based upon the assumption that the
globalisation process does not invade a stable domestic administrative (or private) legal system
from outside, but that it is also a consequence of an evolutionary process that disrupts the legal
system from within. It goes without saying that this evolutionary model does not assume that
the new paradigms replace the older ones completely 13, but that we have to conceive of the
legal system of postmodernity as being multi-layered because the new paradigms are based
upon a secondary respectively tertiary re-modelling of the preceding one. This hypothesis can
explain the unavoidable and legitimate creative role of administrative agencies in the new
transnational realm of decision-making, and allows for a more systematic self-reflection of the
dynamic process of change in administrative and private law.

10

One can even speak about the “fact” in legal contexts as not being a “truth” but the product of a legal
procedure, Barbara J. Shapiro, A CULTURE OF FACT. ENGLAND, 1550 – 1720, 11 (2000).

11

Norbert Elias,THE SOCIETY OF INDIVIDUALS(1939 in German, 1991).

12

Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Intellectual Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, 115,
154 et seq., in: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS, EXPERIENCES (Michael Dowdle, ed., 2006).
13

This is why the question posed by Carolyn J. Hill & Laurence E. Lynn, Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline?
Evidence from Empirical Research, 15 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. RESEARCH AND THEORY ( 2005) 173,
189, is legitimate though the authors’ quantitative focus on the permanence of hierarchical structures of decision
making is only of limited analytical value.
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Some legal theorists have put forward the claim that global law, the Lex Mercatoria as a selforganised practice of private law, in particular, has to be regarded as “less closed” and less
autonomous. 14 However, this would be a misunderstanding: as will be shown later, global law
differs considerably from state-based law; this notwithstanding, the law should not be regarded
as losing its autonomy under conditions of globalisation. Instead, the network paradigm can
contribute to a better understanding of the new types of transnational legal practices: Lex
Mercatoria lacks the coherence and methodological foundation of traditional private law, 15 but
this is not a problem, because the common frame of interests of (mainly) big transnational
firms can compensate for the lack of guidance of the arbitration practices. Its openness is
further attenuated by the practice of referring to clusters of arbitration decisions and the
UNIDROIT-principles. 16 A parallel might be drawn between this new type of entanglement of
norms and contracts in private law, and the new creative function of administrative agencies,
which consists of the design of new forms of action in transnational networks of public and
private actors.
The disruptions and fragmentations emerging from the evolution of the “global law beyond a
state” 17 or, rather, from a heterarchical “network of networks” of law with varying
combinations of characteristics according to actors, transactions, knowledge bases do not –
according to systems theory – call into question the autonomy of law as a self-constructing
system which operates with its own tool box and observes itself within its own horizon, which
14

Assuming only a “relative autonomy” and reducing the law finally to what the judge say what the law is: Michel
van de Kerchove und François Ost, LE DROIT OU LES PARADOXES DU JEU (1992); for an alternative position see G.
Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 149 (1997), id. & Peter Korth, Zwei Arten des Rechtspluralismus: Normkollisionen in der
doppelten Fragmentierung der Weltgesellschaft, 137 in: NORMATIVE PLURALITÄT ORDNEN (Mattias Kötter &
Gunnar Folke Schuppert, eds., 2009); from a political science perspective Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex
Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 627 (2006).
15

Wolfgang Peter, Jean-Quentin de Kuyper & Benedict de Candolle, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 152 (1995); Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la Lex Mercatoria, in:
ETUDES OFFERTES À BERTHOLD GOLDMANN 125, 133 (1983); Andreas Abegg, From the Social Contract to a Social
Contract Law. Forms an Functions of Administrative Contracts in a Fragmented Society: A Continental View, Center
for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Paper, February 2008.
16

Axel Metzger, EXTRA LEGEM, INTRA IUS. ALLGEMEINE RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE IM EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHT
533 (2009); Ursula Stein, LEX MERCATORIA 242 (1995); for the evolution of its self-reflexive momentum see also
Gunther Teubner,”Global Bukowina”. Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in: GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, 12
(1997); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & id., Regime Collision The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of
Global Law, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999 (2004); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil:
Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 400 (2002); Gralf-Peter Calliess & M.
Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The juridification of Global Governance, SSRN-WP 2007; Andreas FischerLescano, Transnationales Verwaltungsrecht, 63 JURISTENZEITUNG 373 (2008); see also the contributions in:
INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (Christoph Möllers, Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter, eds., 2007).
17

See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY 199 (2002).
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cannot but draw a distinction between itself and its environment (the other systems in
particular) and is not just driven by external forces (like the political or the economic system). 18
However, it is not without consequence that it is not just from the point of view of systems
theory that the question “is global law ‘law’?” has to be raised.19 The doubt that the question
may be answered in the negative is one of the uncertainties which irritate the professional
observers of the practices that are termed “global law” as opposed to international law. 20 This
is probably one of the reasons why N. Luhmann took the view that the “world society” 21 beyond the legally-structured nation state and the international public law as centred on the
nation state as well - is increasingly governed by “cognitive” rules, 22 and not in any traditional
normative mode.

C. GLOBAL LAW – IS IT LAW?
In the present discussion on global law, the question “Is it law?” has been raised in particular by
G. Teubner, 23 and, recently, by B. Kingsbury. 24 The recognition of a possible “generation of
18

Kingsbury, supra, note 9; David Dyzenhaus, The Concept of (Global) Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper
2008/7, www.iilj.org; for lex mercatoria Teubner , supra, note 17 ; id & Korth, supra, note 14.

19

Kingsbury, supra, note 9; see also Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, L’arbitrage international: Du contrat
dyadique au système normatif, 52 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT 75 (2009) who focus on the judge-like
stabilisation of a “dyadic” normative practice by a third party; this view underestimates the autonomous creative
potential of a transsubjective practice.

20

See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Die Herausforderung der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die
Internationalisierung der Verwaltungsbeziehungen, 45 DER STAAT 315 (2006); Franz C. Mayer, DIE
INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS (2006); Auby, supra, note 1; Stefano Battini,
AMMINISTRAZIONI SENZA STATO. PROFILI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO INTERNAZIONALE (2003); Sabino Cassese,
LO SPAZIO GIURIDICO GLOBALE (2003); id., The Globalisation of Law, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 976 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S.
Administrative Law, 695.
21

For the concept of the “world society” see Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, 51, in: SOZIOLOGISCHE
AUFKLÄRUNG, Vol. 2, (id., 1975).
22

David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 37, 58, in: RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds., 2009).

23

Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalization of Transnational Corporations? On the Linkage of “Private” and
“Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 17 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 2010, to appear; id.,
Constitutionalising Polycontexturality, 19 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 2010, to appear; id., The Corporate Codes of
Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, 203, in: CONFLICT OF
LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND (Rainer Nickel, ed., 2010); see also id., supra, note 10, 3;
see also Jean-Marie Guéhenno, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995), 100.
24

Kingsbury, supra, note 9; for a critique see Ming-Sung Kuo, Inter-Public Legality or Post-Public-Legitimacy?, A
Response to Professor Kingsbury’s Conception of Global Administrative Law, 20 EJIL 997 (2009; see also Ralf
Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 55 AMERICAN
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norms as a spontaneous process” between equal private actors seems to be quite acceptable
for traditional approaches to law. 25 However, this is different with reference to public law,
which seems to be based upon the will of an institutionalised legislator or a delegation of lawmaking power.26 Some authors even go so far as to deny any evolutionary dimension of public
law that is said to be “intentionally steered”. 27 Traditional public law still draws on the forms
that have emerged in the realm of the nation state, and tends to deny the legal character of the
new phenomena of global law when it seems to transcend the borders of international law. 28
The uncertainties of the new legal order which no longer fit in the forms of law, which have
been moulded by, and with reference to, the state are expressed by the use of the term “soft
law”. 29 Jerry L. Mashaw has convincingly argued that the doubts of the “lawness” of global
administrative law stem from the same origin as the conventional ignorance of the generative
power of administration that manifests itself in the emergence of the “internal administrative
law” in the 19th century. 30 In the following, it will be shown that the basic transformations
domestic administrative law has undergone in the last decades can only be explained if such an
evolutionary dimension of public law, which opens a new perspective also on the emergence of
global administrative law, is recognised.
In international private law, the question of whether Lex Mercatoria is law is controversial, as
well.. 31 In global administrative law, the question can – apparently - be left open according to
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 843 (2007), who give an overview of the discussion and demonstrate the
primarily semantic character of the controversy; Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE. A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 79, 113 (2010), take the view that elements of domestic law
that are transplanted to the transnational sphere of law undergo a “transmutation” – one may think that this is but
another version of the semantic controversy.
25

See Christoph Möllers, Transnational Constitutionalism Without a Public Law?, 329, in: TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004).
26

See with reference to (domestic) standards Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, 293 F3d
th
791, 799 (5 Cir. 2002); Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes, 161, 162: in: Joerges et al., (eds.),
ibid.
27

Möllers, supra, note 25, 330, 338.

28

For the sources of international law that are relevant in global administrative law See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 15, 29 (2005); for the necessity to go beyond these norms in the traditional sense see Christian Tietje,
Recht ohne Rechtsquellen?, 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 27, 40 (2003).
29

Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and International the Law of the Environment, 12 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (1991); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VANDERBILT OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 501 (2009); for the far spread conceptual vagueness see also Anne Peters & Lucy Koechlin,
Towards Non State-Actors as Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard Setters, 492, 495, in: NON-STATE
ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (ead, ead.,Till Förster, and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, eds., 2009).
30
31

Mashaw, supra, note 6, 1470, 1476.

See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 NDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 447 (2007) (that lex mercatoria can neither be reduced to “anational” law nor to a derivative of state law
but hat attained a new quality of a law beyond the state that combines diverse elements ); see the documentation
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many authors, because also domestic administrative practice have acknowledged a number of
forms of preparation, of internal rule-making, procedures which have a strong impact on the
legal processes without being (unanimously) regarded as being legal acts or legal norms in the
stricter sense. 32 G. Teubner – as a private lawyer – is focused on private legal norms, and takes
the view that it is “global civil society” to which the new forms of societal legal norms can, and,
indeed, have to, be attributed as an authoritative “source” of law beyond the state. This
approach pre-supposes a new “societal constitutionalism” 33 that stipulates a law-making
potential beyond the traditional forms of the state. 34 The spontaneously generated norms of
transnational operations (not only commercial in the narrower sense, but also including the
“Lex Digitalis” of the global communication order or Lex Sportiva 35 as the law of the
transnational sports organisations and their rule-making requirements) are not generally
recognised as law 36 by state-based tribunals, whereas, in fact, as long as this “law” can make
use of its own institutions (the international mediation procedures), it is, at least, a functional
equivalent to law in the stricter sense. G. Teubner takes a more principled approach and, as a
consequence of the acknowledgment of the norm-giving power of the “global civil society”,
attributes legal character in the stricter sense to Lex Mercatoria – following the terminology of
H.L.A. Hart - because it has generated its own “secondary rules”, i.e., procedures of reflection,
distinction and control, as opposed to non-institutionalised norms of morality, etc.37 This
reference risks to be reductionist because it sets aside the paradox of the self-generation of the
law as a social practice, as a “language” with its eigenvalue, and to end up in a circular
of the controversy in Klaus-Peter Berger, FORMALISIERTE ODER “SCHLEICHENDE KODIFIIZIERUNG” DES
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS (1996) (containing a differentiated discussion of all major pros and cons
with reference to the question “is it law?”; see also (skeptically) Jan Kropkoller, INTERNATIONALES EINHEITSRECHT
123 (1996); more positively: Ursula Stein, LEX MERCATORIA 211 et seq. (1996); Hans-Joachim Mertens, Das Lex
Mercatoria Problem, in: FESTSCHRIFT ODERSKY 857, 860 (Reinhard Böttcher et al., 1996).
32

Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS
LAW REVIEW 553 (1998) (describing the normative effects of technology on the legal structure of transactions via
information technology). .
33

David Sciulli, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY
(1992).
34

Gunther Teubner, Verfassungen ohne Staat? Zur Konstitutionalisierung transnationaler Regimes, in: RECHT
OHNE STAAT (to appear, Klaus Günther & Stefan Kadelbach, eds., 2010).

35

Reidenberg, supra, note 32; Birgit Rost, DIE HERAUSBILDUNG TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS AUF
DEM GEBIET DER INTERNATIONALEN FINANZ- UND KAPITALMÄRKTE 251 (2007); Christopher M. Bruner, States,
Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, 165 (2008);.Franck Latty, LA LEX SPORTIVA. RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT
TRANSNATIONAL (2007).
36

See for this argument with reference to the Lex Mercatoria Berger, supra, note 31, 75; for a theoretical
reconstruction of an autonomous law beyond the state ee Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Globalisation and
the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY 199 (2002).
37

See Teubner & Korth, supra, note 14.
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argumentation which shifts the criterion for the recognition of “lawness” just to a meta-norm. 38
Such an approach tends to neglect the emergent character of legal institutions which are only
stabilized by secondary norms “after the fact”. The following analysis tries to shed some light
on the historical transformations within domestic administrative law which generate new
institutions in emergent processes for a better understanding of the specificity of a global
administrative law perhaps not “without the state” but with “entangled hierarchies” which do
not (yet?) allow for a clear distinction of “primary” and “secondary norms”.

III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. THE ESSENCE OF THE “POSITIVE LAW” OF THE LIBERAL SOCIETY: ITS RULE-LIKE CHARACTER
In a deeper sense, a law that – as one might rephrase the above-mentioned quotation from the
recent book of Joyce Appleby – rests on the assumption that “nobody is in charge of the
collective order”, is “positive”. 39 As a consequence, it is “non-instrumental”, in the sense that it
refers to a “relationship in terms of rules”. 40 These rules are decoupled from substantive values,
and allow for the co-ordination among agents who pursue their self-chosen goals. This
assumption raises a lot of criticism about the collective and social character of the individual – a
criticism which misses the point. Clearly, the individual is not - in a meaningful sense - to be presupposed as the creator of his or her own self. Individuality is - itself - a social form that
underlies permanent change.41 The non-instrumentality of the “positive” law and its
corresponding conception of individual freedom do not invoke the “voluntary disposition of
self-interested economic actors”.42 They pre-suppose an acentric society the collective order of
which resides in the permanent emergence of innovations that establish a “play of ideas”,43 a
pool of variety that contains an excess of possibilities over reality generated from the practices
of co-operation, competition, imitation, and experimentation in society. Clearly, this process
generates not only spontaneously, but also in a reflexive form of second order observation of
the very rules and patterns its own infrastructure, meta-rules and stabilising institutions.
However, it is most important to underline that the individual as a merely “self-interested
38

Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, Hart et le positivisme postmoderne en droit international, 113 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 635 (2009); also Niklas Luhmann, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 123, 125 et seq. (2004).
39

Joyce Appleby, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 248 (2010).

40

Michael Oakeshott, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 140 (1975); Terry Nardin, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT
202 (2001); see also, EdwardF. McClennen, Rationality and Rules,13, in: Peter A. Danielson (ed), MODELING
RATIONALITY, MORALITY AND EVOLUTION 13 (1998).
41

See, generally, Markus Schroer, DAS INDIVIDUUM DER GESELLSCHAFT (2003); Jean-Claude Kaufmann,
L’INVENTION DE SOI: UNE THÉORIE DE L’IDENTITÉ (2004); Kenneth J. Gergen, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF
IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE (1992); Joanne Finkelstein, THE ART OF SELF-INVENTION (2007).

42

Wolfgang Streeck, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
156 (2010).
43

Appleby, supra, note 39, 156.
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economic actor” is primarily not a myth of liberal society, but one of its critics. This can be
demonstrated by referring to the present discussion of the protection of the “commons” of
culture against private appropriation in the digital world and its equivalent in the genetic
engineering. The relationship between privately-owned knowledge and the “intellectual
commons” is a permanent problem of liberal society, but one should not overlook the
collective, albeit distributed, character of the core of the “common knowledge” of society,44
which was characterised by open access and restricted by patent law only to a limited extent. In
the economic order of the liberal society, a “culture of improvement” 45 is enshrined, which
was always open to knowledge transfer which was, to a large extent, not only accepted as being
unavoidable, but also as being productive for the permanent generation of technological
innovation and competition. This process does not exclude “public intervention” – on the
contrary, apparently, the public knowledge infrastructure in countries such as Germany in the
19th century had a positive impact on the culture of innovation. 46

B. THE GENERATION OF THE “ACTE ADMINISTRATIF”
ACTION IN THE “SOCIETY OF THE INDIVIDUALS”

AS THE

MAIN FORM

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

The focus on legitimation and the derivative logic of the “application” of norms to cases misses
the internal dynamics of the legal system, which is due to the subjective right as an institution
which not only opens the potential for societal self-organisation of the economy, politics, the
arts, etc., but also opens society towards a distributed rationality of continuous transformation
because it changes the temporal orientation from the past (the “given” and its reproduction as
the aim of society) to the future and the uncertainty that it generates. The legal norms basically
do not “steer” society in modernity, but protect the self-organisational potential inherent in the
unrest which it introduces in the “society of the individuals”. 47 This self-organisational potential
comes to the fore when the legal system is challenged by the dynamic knowledge base which
generates “experience” as a distributed type of knowledge which no longer accepts a central
privileged point of observation of society which is either “given” by tradition or claimed to be
possessed by the political sovereign power in the European absolutist states. 48 In Germany, this
“sovereign” knowledge, which combines normative and empirical aspects in as much as it
44

See for this concept Herbert Gintis, Rationality and Common Knowledge, 22 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 259
(2010).
45

Robert Friedel, A CULTURE OF IMPROVEMENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE WESTERN MILLENNIUM (2007).

46

See generally Rainer Wolf, DER STAND DER TECHNIK (1986); Milos Več, RECHT UND NORMIERUNG IN DER
INDUSTRIELLEN REVOLUTION 272, 367 (2006).

47
48

See only Appleby, supra, note 39, 248.

See on the emergence of the public knowledge that is needed for the government of the absolutist state Michel
Senellart, LES ARTS DE GOUVERNER. DU REGIMEN MEDIEVAL AU CONCEPT DE GOUVERNEMENT, 236 et seq.
(1995).
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claims that the administrative state holds this privileged position which allows us to know what
the requirements of the public order are, is termed “Polizeywissenschaft” (“police science”). 49
The new administrative law of the second half of the 19th century 50 undergoes a fundamental
change when it accepts that the concept of order mainly refers to a factual normality and its
description by societal experience, and is no longer based upon the traditional knowledge of
the sovereign state. 51 This is why it would be superficial to take the “acte administratif”
(“Verwaltungsakt”), the sovereign unilateral administrative decision that has binding force even
if it is not in conformity with the law, at face value. 52 It is meant to to deliver “fixed points” in
the “floating mass of administrative activities”.53 Both legislation and legal doctrine were more
interested in very broad issues of the general legal order, whereas the operation with the
increasing complexity of technical knowledge and industrial innovation were left to the
discretion of administrators. 54 The “acte administratif” corresponds to the distributed logic of
the “private law society” (Privatrechtsgesellschaft) 55 which processes innovation, experiment
and social experience. 56 The authoritarian character 57 of the “acte administratif”
49

Matthias Bohlender, Metamorphosen des Gemeinwohls – von der Herrschaft guter polizey zur Regierung durch
Freiheit und Eigentum, 247, in: GEMEINWOHL UND GEMEINSINN –HISTORISCHE SEMANTIKEN POLITISCHER
LEITBEGRIFFE (Herfried Münkler & Harald Bluhm, eds,. 2001).
50

See for the development in Germany Michael Stolleis, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN
DEUTSCHLAND, VOL 2: 1800 – 1914, 410 et seq. (1992): the concept had found its contours only at the end of the
th
19 century; the same goes for France, cf. Philippe Belaval, Foreword, in: Cédric Milhat, L’ACTE ADMINISTRATIF:
ENTRE PROCESSUS ET PROCEDURES 7 (2007).
51

In a theoretical perspective see Pierre Macherey, PETITS RIENS. ORNIÈRES ET DERIVES DU QUOTIDIEN 21 (2009);
id., DE CANGUILHEM À FOUCAULT. LA FORCE DES NORMES 77 (2009).

52

The focus of German (and French) administrative law on the Verwaltungsakt (“acte administratif”) is said to have
focused on state intervention and to have neglected the role of the administration in the development of benefits
administration and infrastructure in particular, Kersten & Lenski, supra, note 9, at 504; but this is far from
convincing because the American evolution follows the same track without being focused on the “administrative
act”, Mashaw, supra, note 7.
53

Otto Mayer, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, Vol. I, 95 (1914).

54

Več, supra, note 46, 281; Erk-Volkmar Heyen, Deutschland, in: GESCHICHTE DER
VERWALTUNGSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN EUROPA 29, 32 (id., ed., 1982); H. Berthélémy, TRAITÉ DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF ÉLÉMENTAIRE, 8th ed., 354 et seq. (1916) for the regulation of „installations classées”.
55

It is not a coincidence that one of the founders of modern public law in Germany, Carl Friedrich von Gerber
nd
(GRUNDZÜGE EINES SYSTEMS DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 2 ed., 1869) was first a private lawyer; his focus
on the “will power” (“Willensmacht”) of the state and its putative “blindness” to political goal finds its reverse side
in the openness toward the observation of the social dynamic of a liberal society; see also Carsten Kremer, DIE
WILLENSMACHT DES STAATES. DIE GEMEINDEUTSCHE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE DES CARL FRIEDRICH VON GERBER,
296 (2008) (for the relationship between goals and “willpower”).
56

The work by Reimund Schmidt-De Caluwe, DER VERWALTUNGSAKT IN DER LEHRE OTTO MAYERS 63 et seq.
(1999) and Michael Stolleis, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND, Vol. II, 332 et seq. (1992)
th
overstate the political connotation of the emerging German administrative law in the 19 century and neglect its
internal rationality; more differentiated Thomas von Danwitz, VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES SYSTEM UND
EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 31 et seq. (1996); Roger Müller, VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS WISSENSCHAFT,FRITZ
FLEINER 1867 – 1937, 100 (2006).
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(Verwaltungsakt) should not be taken at face value; it is an extremely modern instrument that
that has demonstrated its flexibility even under postmodern conditions of complexity. 58 It is a
form of a flexible public intervention that corresponds to the character of the positivist law
“without a goal” of its own.
The “acte administratif” has both an external function (in the limitation of subjective rights) and
an internal function which allows administration to process rational decision-making on a caseby-case mode 59 from which a structure emerges which can be deciphered both by the
administrative practitioners themselves and by private actors. If this process is not in line with
the experience diffused and reproduced by society, and if it comes into conflict with the rights
of the private actors, it can be controlled by courts with reference to the rationality of the
decision-making process itself. This conflict gives courts the opportunity to re-process the
“actes administratifs” in a network of judicial decisions with a view to the legitimate
expectations which can be formulated and further processed upon the basis of the “rights” of
private actors. In this way, the “acte administratif” is “re-coded” as an infringement in personal
rights while, at the same time, it is processed in the administrative decision-making procedures
which contribute to the stabilisation of the impersonal inter-relationships 60 which allow for the
self-organisation of society. This evolution corresponds to the rise of “realism”, a social ideology
that challenges the holistic conceptions of German idealism and opens a perspective on the
dynamic of “will power as the point of departure for a new construction of society – as distinct
from tradition. 61
Here, we are confronted with the blind spot of the legal system, which demonstrates difficulties
in acknowledging the process-like acentric character of the evolution of its own frames of
reference. It is not by coincidence that Philippe Belaval, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat,
in his preface to a book on the modern use of the “acte administratif” refers to the “plurality of
the architects” of the concept 62 - a view that pre-supposes that the elements of architectural

57

The focus on willpower fits in the general trend towards a social-darwinian “vitalism” as a far spread everyday
philosophy in Germany that is neither liberal in a political sense nor democratic but not antimodern; see Jürgen
Große, LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE 89, 101 (2010), where the momentary expression of willpower in response to a
situation is highlighted.
58

Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die Zukunft des Verwaltungsakts, 86 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 511 (1995)..

59

Marcel Gauchet, L’Etat au miroir de la raison d’Etat: La France et la chrétienté, in: RAISON ET DERAISON D’ETAT
193, 237 (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1 994).
60

Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED SOCIAL HISTORY 261 (2009).

61

See the wonderful book by Jacques Le Rider, L’ALLEMAGNE AU TEMPS DU RÉALISME. DE L’ESPOIR AU
DÉSENCHANTEMENT 1848 – 1890, 33, 46, 52 (2008).
62

Belaval, supra, note 50, 7.
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design are pre-determined and given.63 From a postmodern perspective that takes into
consideration the approaches of comparative research in literature which try to describe the
text as a paradoxical effect of an anonymous intertextuality, the co-presence of other texts
which interfere with the production of meaning beyond the will of the author,64 one might get
an idea of how basic concepts of public law such as the “acte administratif” (Verwaltungsakt) in
continental European law can only be regarded as the result of a process that writes itself
within an “environment of possibilities” (“environnement des possibles”). 65 It is the emergent
product of a discontinuous process of variation of cases, the stabilisation of “local equilibria”,
and of transcending them in crises and of the search for new “local equilibria”.66 Certain
possibilities are given up, others are retained and interwoven in a multitude of inclusive options
and exclusive constraints. 67 This inter-disciplinary approach sheds some light on the distribution
of competencies between administration, administrative courts and the legislator. The focus on
legitimation is misleading, because it tends to reduce the processing of the administrative act to
its “would-be” origin in the Ancien Régime and to oppose it to the democratic will as the only
acceptable source of legitimation. Without a “discursive memory” that links - in retrospect - the
distributed intertextuality of the implicit 68 construction of a basic legal institution to a
prospective generative dimension within a domain of options that is only - to a limited extent the object of explicit design, a productive role of the legislation is inconceivable. 69

63

See from a perspective of the humanities Michel Charles, INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DES TEXTES 221 (1995).

64

Gérard Genette, PALIMPSESTES. LA LITERATURE AU SECOND DEGRÉ 8 (1982).

65

Charles, supra, note 63, 102.

66

Charles, supra, note 63, 102.

67

This reference to the acentric intertextuality of the selftransformation of law may in fact be more adequate to
legal theory than the focus on “evolution” which can only be used in a more or less metaphorical way because
there is no functional equivalent to genes in the legal system; see for the observation of oscillatory processes at
the “borders” of the legal system Fabian Steinhauer, GERECHTIGKEIT ALS ZUFALL. ZUR RHETORISCHEN EVOLUTION
DES RECHTS 94 (2007); Marc Amstutz, EVOLUTORISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 271 et seq. (2001); Gunther
Teubner, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 221et seq., 226 (1988) (the focus on
“pattern prediction” still remains vague and is ignorant of selftransformation processes that the system cannot
control), Niklas Luhmannn, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT, Vol. 1, 549 (1997) takes the view that the
“evolution of ideas” is context dependent and does not underlie the control by argumentation – what this means
for the evolution of system remains unclear; critically Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STANFORD
LAW REVIEW 57, 81 (1984); also Lawrence Rosen, LAW AS CULTURE 56 et seq. (2006).
68
69

Michael Polanyi, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1998).

This does not mean that no radical reform is possible because the model that could only be briefly sketched
cannot exclude that search processes end in a lock-in that blocks any productive experimentation; see the paper
by Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Consequences of Radical Reform:
The French Revolution, Discussion Paper 2010, http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5644 (arguing plausibly that the
th
Napoleonic reforms introduced in several German territories at the beginning of the 19 century had lasting
positive effects on the economic development.
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This is why the requirement of a democratic legitimation for both private and public law can
only be acknowledged to a very limited extent. 70 The administrative law of the “society of
individuals” is closely linked to the logic of private law and its reference to the self-organisation
of differentiated societal systems (the economy in particular). It introduces a similar logic into
public law because its cognitive frame of reference is now the society and its practical
knowledge basis and not “police science” as in the past. 71 Police power, which is the core of
administrative decision-making, refers to a societal dynamic conception of the “normality” 72 –
not to factual tradition and not to a privileged knowledge possessed by the state.73 However,
the close link between the normative and cognitive elements of the definition and the
protection of “public order” is preserved, 74 even though it has to be observed and reflected in a
much more sophisticated mode than in the past. 75 This is all the more the case because
knowledge takes on a dynamic character itself 76 - in the same vein as the law. The state makes
itself “understandable” by laying open the knowledge base which it wants to establish for

70

See Ralph Michaels, Umdenken für die UNIDROIT Prinzipien: Vom Rechtswahlstatut zum Allgemeinen Teil des
transnationalen Vertragsrechts, 73 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 866 (2009).
71

th

th

Bohlender, supra, note 49; the mostly smaller German states in the late 17 and early 18 century had tried to
epitomise an administrative rationality as the legitimation basis of public power, Yves-Charles Zarka, PHILOSOPHIE
ET POLITIQUE À L’ÂGE CLASSIQUE 158 (1998); Michel Senellart, LES ARTS DE GOUVERNER. DU REGIME MEDIEVAL
AU CONCEPT DE GOUVERNEMENT 282 (1995); id., “Juris peritus, id est politicus”? Bodin et les théoritiens
allemands de la prudence civile politique au XVIIe siècle, 201, 216 et seq., in: JEAN BODIN. NATURE, HISTOIRE,
DROIT ET POLITIQUE (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1996) this allowed for the development of a compromise between an
approached which remained focused on the state and an approach which described the state as a function of
society. Because of the rise of a fragmented “special knowledge” as a basis for public decision making it seems
doubtful that the concept of “police science” can be revitalized under conditions of postmodernity, See however
the contributions in: THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE. THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde, eds., 2006).
72

See the famous “Kreuzberg”-judgment of the Prussian Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) of
th
June 14 , 1882, Reports (OVGE)) Vol. 9, 353; See Volkmar Götz, ALLGEMEINES POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHT,
th
13 ed., 18 (2001); for the historical development in France, in particular the flexibility of the emerging police law
see Paolo Napoli, NAISSANCE DE LA POLICE MODERNE: POUVOIRS , NORMES, SOCIÉTÉ 15 (2003).
73

Bohlender, supra, note 49; for the US see T. R. Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power, 24 HARVARD
LAW REVIEW 268 (1911); for France Senellart, supra, note 48.
74

Paolo Napoli, Misura di polizia. Un approccio storicoconcettuale in età moderna, 44 QUADERNI STORIC I 523
(2009).
75

For the broad conception of “police” in the ancien regime See Pasquale Pasquino, THEORIES OF THE STATE IN
EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 42, 61, in: Dubber & Valverde (eds.), supra, note 71.
76

th

One element of the new coordination between state and society in the 19 century is the rise of statistics and its
use by both public and private actors: Theodore M. Porter, Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation
of Statistics in Germany, 1850–1880, 351, in: THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION , VOL. 1 (Lorenz Krüger, Lorraine J.
Daston & Michael Heidelberger, eds.,1987).
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administration 77 and the world has to be made calculable.78 “Experience” is based upon selftransformation of society as is the legal system. 79 This new perspective changes the status or
the rule in general: it is generated “bottom up” from individual behaviour, and not from a
totalising point of view, 80 which would be incompatible with the experimental order
established by private law. This new dynamism comes to the fore both in police law, which
observes the new economic and technical dynamism referring to the distinction of
“danger”/normality (in conformity with experience), and models its “control project” on the
patterns of the societal self-understanding of technology (control of steam engines, gas
containers, safety of buildings, etc.). 81 The “normal” is not dangerous.82 The same is true for
private law where, for example, the requirements of the conclusion of a contract or the
definition of “negligent” (unlawful) behaviour refer to experience emerging in society.
The state even intervenes in the activities to distribute experience in society when its
knowledge remains restricted to local or regional communities. It presses for the establishment
of private self-organised organisations which are meant to evaluate and promote experience
which can be regarded as reliable (Technischer Überwachungsverein, TÜV, Verein Deutscher
Ingenieure , VDI, etc.). 83 This shows that the legal system cannot be onlycognitively open on a
case-to-case basis and adhere to stable legal rules at the general level: there is a continuous
exchange between a normalised societal experience which is increasingly formulated in
technical rules for the construction of machinery, or the construction of buildings. And both
private law and public law have to refer to this “normal” knowledge” when it comes to the
question of whether damage (caused by the explosion of a gas container, for example) was to
be attributed to “negligence” (ex post) or whether it had to be regarded as “dangerous” by
police (ex ante). This does not mean that the economic system or technology impose certain
rules on the legal system and call its self-construction into question – not at all. Legal rules
cannot be processed without a reference to societal rules and the self-generated “internal law”
of administration 84 – this constitutive link between recurring patterns of behaviour in society
77

Marcel Gauchet, L’Etat au miroir de la raison d’Etat: La France et la chrétienté,193, 237 in: RAISON ET DERAISON
D’ETAT (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1994).

78

Alain Desrosières, THE POLITICS OF LARGE NUMBERS. A HISTORY OF STATISTICAL REASONING (1998); François
Ewald, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986); Theodore J. Porter, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING (1986).

79

Alexandre Lefebvre, THE IMAGE OF LAW. DELEUZE, BERGSON, SPINOZA 15 (2008).

80

Claude Gauthier, L’INVENTION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE 233 (1993).

81

The police power as a “governmental practice” of the state preserves its forms but it exchanges the cognitive
schemes it draws on; see Paolo Napoli, “Police”. La conceptualisation d’un modele juridico-politique sous l’Ancien
Régime, 20 DROITS 183 (1994) and 21 DROITS 151 (1995).
82

Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Coping With Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the Proceduralisation of Environmental Law,
299, in: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL
SELF-ORGANIZATION (Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer & Declan Murphy, eds., 1994).
83
84

Wolf, supra, note 46.

Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1413, 1461; the concept goes back to Bruce Wyman, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903).
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and the normative patterns which have to be constructed, observed and tested in the legal
system is essential to the legal rationality. 85 This does not mean that normal knowledge is just
blindly introduced into the legal system. On the contrary, the legal system can, and has to,
observe whether these practical rules are sufficient, reliable, have to be modified upon the
basis of new experience, etc. Normality and normativity are closely linked, and this link is
continuously observed, revised and re-modelled.
Administrative law is driven by two contradictory forces: on the one hand, the administrative
agents behave as a “community of experimentalists”, 86 which operates with a kind of implicit
horizontal linking from case-to-case, whereas courts, on the other hand, have a tendency
towards a type of explicit conceptual re-coding, which tries to limit the processes of selforganisation that are necessarily inherent in the administrative practice. There is a permanent
interplay between these two types of internal and external stabilisation of the administrative
legal process. However, it would be superficial to regard the judicial practice as the creator of
the institutions of administrative law. 87 Its stabilisation is the outcome of a co-operative
process which is only moulded in statute law much later. This process can be regarded as a
distributed evolutionary process 88 which draws upon the different functions of administration
and judiciary. 89 The autonomy of the “relational rationality” of administrative decision-making
should not be derived from “expertise” 90 in a stricter analytical sense, but is due to the
evolutionary character of the dynamic self-transformation of society: this evolutionary process
which subsumes administrative law to a permanent unrest from which new patterns and
instruments of decision-making are generated can be described as drawing on an “abductive”
approach (following the terminology of Charles S. Peirce) 91 which is a reasoning that creates a
new meaning from the observation of “cases” and conflicting rationales, and leads to a
broadening perspective on the societal pool of variety beyond the possibility of inferring a new
stable rule that can be “applied”. 92 It is more a kind of a “move” within a game with incomplete
85

Lefebvre, supra, note 79, 59.

86

See generally Peter Ochs, Peirce, PRAGMATISM AND THE LOGIC OF SCRIPTURE 107 (1998).

87

Mashaw, supra note 7, 1378.

88

See Müller, supra, note 56, 86 in particular; generally Wolfgang Meyer-Hesemann, METHODENWANDEL IM
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1981).
89

See for a critique of the Chevron-approach Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:
How Chevron Misconceives the the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
673, 677 (2007).
90

See for this argument Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, S. Ct. 127 2339, 2346-47 (2007).

91

Christiane Chauviré, Peirce et la signification. Introduction à la logique du vague 201 (1995).

92

See in defense of the rationality of administrative decision making Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the
Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 501
(2005).
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rules which emerge from the game itself. This is a logic of incompleteness that is not accessible
from a control-project which epitomises conformity to rules.
But to describe administrative law and its institutions in the 19th century as judge-made law
misses the point: it is mainly an autonomous product of administration itself both in Europe
and the US:
“The structures and processes of administrative adjudication were designed and built
almost entirely by the administrative agencies themselves.” 93
This is true also for the US: Jerry L. Mashaw has epitomised the generation of “transsubstantive” internal rules of decision-making by administrative decision-makers in the 19th
century. 94 For the US, it is quite characteristic that the existence of much of this earlier
administrative law was even denied at all,95 mainly because it did not fit in the model of
accountability and legitimacy of law. The US administrative law is not based upon a focal
construction like the French and German “acte administratif” (“Verwaltungsakt”); however, it is
also centred on the search for the adequate forms of intervention into individual rights and the
processes of self-organisation that their use unleashes. 96

C. INTERMEDIARY REMARKS ON
KNOWLEDGE BASE” OF SOCIETY

THE

EMBEDDEDNESS

OF THE LEGAL

SYSTEM

IN THE

“EPISTEMIC

Historians of social and economic institutions, such as Joel Mokyr, have underlined - with good
reasons - the hypothesis that one should not over-estimate the role of formal institutions in the
evolution of modern western societies. 97 Cultural beliefs and self-enforcing practices of trustbuilding and reputation were at least as important as formal institutions. 98 The complex legal
system is rooted in a broader “epistemic knowledge base”. We will see later that the one-sided
perspective on the legal system in the stricter sense leads to futile questions on what the legal
nature of “global administrative law” really is. 99 This approach either leads to the fixation of a
traditional static concept of law or the problematical assumption that a global civil society can
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be regarded as generating and “constitutionalising” its own legal system beyond the state.100
The focus should, instead, be on the permanent unrest inherent in the experimental acentric
order of (post-) modern society which introduces an evolutionary “drift” 101 into the cultural
memory of society, which is also a challenge for the legal system, because there is a close interrelationship between the cognitive and the normative rationality of society.
The knowledge order of society was (and is) constituted in a way which not only differentiates
between general knowledge (“in the books” and in practical experience) and privately
appropriated information (legally-protected by patents or practical processes of keeping knowhow secret in firms) but also left open a broad range of operations of freely-sharing information
(which seems to be regarded by many protagonists of the internet world as something
completely new – which is definitely not the case). Robert C. Allen calls this phenomenon
“collective invention” 102 which includes, for example, the spread of the steam engine as a basic
innovation of the 19th century. Especially in the UK and later also in Germany and other
countries, social conventions and “self-enforcing modes of behaviour” 103 were much more
important for the stabilisation of the legal system than the formal adjudication by independent
judges in ividual cases of conflict. It is quite characteristic that the goals of policing in Germany
included the preservation of “public order” (as opposed to “public security” 104 in the narrower
sense) i.e., the observation of the “appropriate” behaviour in public and the respect for social
conventions (below the level of formal law) such as disciplined and controlled self-presentation
in public including basic norms of politeness, clothing, cleaning, sexuality, 105 etc.
These remarks should have made it clear that, in the “society of individuals” 106 of the 19th
century, both public and private law were based upon complex layers of social knowledge,
conventions and professional practices, all of which were enshrined in the public order at large
or in social and technical experience. Without reference to this cognitive infrastructure, neither
private nor administrative decision-making can be understood.

100
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The “administrative act” was, as seen in the perspective opened here, not a relict of the
absolutist state, but a modern instrument of rationalising administrative practices and of coordination between the society of the individuals and the preservation of “public order”.107It
turns it into the new experimental order that can no longer draw on a fixed set of rules and
traditions. Its new form is a product of the evolutionary “drift” of the development of
administrative law, which can only ex post be stabilised by “judge made law” or later by the
legislator.

D. THE SECONDARY RE-MODELLING OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SOCIETY OF
THE INDIVIDUALS
The exchange process between the law and the structured practical networks which generate
and distribute societal experience is in constant flux. 108 A distinction has to be made between
the continuous flow of information which emerges from the permanent variation within
societal knowledge basis, and the momentary suspension of normality by the rise of new
factual paradigms which induce a kind of “break of symmetry” in the inter-relationship between
technical normal knowledge and the feedback loops which have to be designed within the legal
network of networks. This was, for example, the case when the knowledge process became
more dynamic and, as a consequence, the concept of normality had to be re-framed:
increasingly, this dynamic is reflected in the legal system when the question is raised as to
whether bigger firms have a duty to take an active part in the creation of knowledge and are no
longer allowed just to adapt to the current “state of the art” 109 or when (in administrative law)
the orientation on experience and “danger” (in the end: damage) is at stake.
The hitherto central unilateral administrative decision is in decline – not only in global
administrative law. Things get more complicated to judge if one bears in mind that this is also
true for domestic law. At the global level in particular, not only informal measures and
procedures take the lead over the “acte administratif” as expression of the internal sovereignty
of the state, but also the norms which are referred to in global law are mainly not legal norms
which are part of international public law, but factual standards or, if one may put it this way,
self-organised “norms in being”, procedural rules in particular.
The same goes for the concept of “person” as a cornerstone of the liberal positive legal order:
this concept draws on the stability of roles and the attribution of future-oriented expectations
to legal actors abstracted from the stability of tradition. 110 Once the person is supplemented by
107
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108
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Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle , eds., 2008).
109
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the organisation and – recently – by networks of relationship, one may assume that the
fundamental relevance of the person has changed, as well. The role of the person is mediated
by its position in organisations and networks. 111 Expectations can be multi-faceted under both
conditions of complexity 112 and the dynamic of self-transcendence of liberal society. This
dynamic allows for a new type of reflexivity of the legal order, which can operate with an open
linkage between norms in the stricter sense and a whole range of different types of “social
norms”,113 which, in the past, remained more or less hidden in the administrative practices.114
Both components of the normative order are permeable for a reflexive acentric modelling of
“expectations of expectations” both by and between organisations that have more strategic
potential, in as much as they can construct longer chains of actions.
The new reflexivity gives sufficient space for a “management of rules” which re-models the
distinction between legal and factual norms: the spontaneous character is replaced more and
more by explicit “standards” that demonstrate a new fragmentation and heterogeneity within
the social knowledge base: experience based knowledge has to distinguished from the “best
available knowledge”, 115 in particular. Knowledge is further dynamised. This development
includes the necessity to find procedural meta-norms for the observation of the new versions of
the “loops” between both types of rules because there are, of course, problems which raise the
question of how a norm has to be characterised: this is the case when the rights of persons who
did not participate in the creation of the norm are infringed. However, this is not often to be
assumed, because, in the society of organisations, 116 persons are, in many constellations,
legally represented by organisations or are subsumed under new general patterns of
expectations beyond the classical “no harm” principle (for example, protection by public
insurance, transformation of liability, including strict liability, the creation of group rights, such
as the rights of workers and consumers). Often, no external effect of norms can be observed
because it is only the general framework of decision-making that is touched by an
organisational process. Many social norms are more a kind of functional equivalent to the
process of self-construction of experience as a collective, distributed knowledge base.
111
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The more complex type of administrative decision-making that comes to the fore in the
domains of planning, high technology (nuclear power, genetic engineering) and risk, in
particular, demonstrate that the construction of a balancing decision in these fields is not
equivalent to the classical type of a judgment based upon a “statutory interpretation”.117 This
was the basis for the German legal conception of a structured process of planning that
distinguishes the stable and the creative elements of decision-making. More often than not, the
difference between public and private decision-making is not so fundamental: in both cases,
the underlying legal norms are (mainly) not applied (when one can speak about a realm of
discretion) but are referred to as limits to a self-organised practice of administration or a publicprivate “joint venture”.
The interplay between administrative decision-making and the law is historically changing: the
external legislative norm or the judicial decision-making processes can exercise their stabilising
role once a certain “internal” administrative practice has settled in a rule-like manner, while, in
times of transformation, administrative horizontal-heterarchical approaches of processing from
case-to-case in a creative way tend to experiment with new forms of administrative operation
that do not follow rule-like patterns. This is creative function which one may call the
“modernising mission”, which David A. Strauss 118 attributes - with good reason - to the
judiciary, but which includes - in a differentiated way - the administration, as well.
One has to accept that, from the outset, the public dimension of technical (and, later on, the
more complex technological) risks and the private process of production are entangled.
Technologies in postmodern society are more dependent on complex design and are “hybrid”,
in as much as they often pre-suppose the development of a whole domain of options including
far reaching potential side-effects on third parties or on human values (nuclear power,
genetically modified organisms, nano-technology, etc.). However, technological questions have
always had a societal dimension.119
In environmental law, 120 the pivotal role of the practical experience based upon the
observation of damage is called into question,121 and the control project for high technology
trajectories has to be adapted to risk management and the precautionary principle, upon which
117
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it is based. For our perspective, it is important to bear in mind that these deep transformations
within the technological networks and the legal network of practices which try to learn from
them find their repercussion in the legal system, albeit only partially.
One of its major transformations is to be seen – from the “cognitivist” point of view taken here,
i.e., the observation of the emergence and transformation of rules and institutions as elements
of a societal memory – in the rise of the groups and organisations as the actors and as the
generators of new types of knowledge in particular: the increasing importance of probabilities,
groups with statistical regularities, the evolution of technologies of production and
management (“expert knowledge” 122 as opposed to distributed “experience” based upon
action and upon the observation of its consequences) have had a strong impact even on
administrative law. However, it would be an illusion to reduce the new discretionary power
gained by reference to expertise to a mere delegation of power by parliament.123

E. GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS THE PRODUCT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIMENTATION … AND
ITS JUDICIALISATION
Upon the basis of the theoretical reflections given above, one should, first of all, bear in mind
that administrative law could not and cannot be conceived of as being mainly a product of the
legislator. The same is valid for private law. Both legal domains are characterised by the
challenge of enabling processes to cope with the fundamental uncertainty and the dynamic of
the self-transformation of society and to generate forms of binding them in order to allow for
co-operation, co-ordination, and learning. Both the development of the administrative law of
the “society of the individuals” and the successive administrative law of the “society of
organisations” could only be the emergent product of primarily administrative experimentation
and of the retention of successful forms of action 124 including the increasing importance of
procedure 125 as a resource for the creation 126 and combination of knowledge for decision122
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making processes.127 Both in the private industry and in public administration, the use of
experience as the common societal knowledge basis was no longer sufficient. 128 It is not by
accident that, in a country such as Germany, since the early 1960s, a continuous process of
broadening the scope of judicial control over the whole domain of the administration, which, in
the past, had been reserved for non-legal administrative rationality (schools, status of public
staff).129 In the same vein, discretion has been increasingly judicialised. 130 As in the US, in
Germany, too, there has been a permanent broadening of the acceptable arguments in legal
controversies: more and more public decision-making is not only subject to strict control upon
the basis of specific legal arguments, but also reference to the “principle of proportionality”131
or a broad understanding of constitutional liberties (which include “principles of protection”
beyond the traditional conception of negative liberties) are commonplace today. This evolution
is hailed by many as a phenomenon of “legalisation” of factual power. 132 Upon closer
inspection, this view appears to be superficial because it neglects the decline of the impact of
the self-organised knowledge base and the set of social conventions which defined a collective
understanding of a “common sake” of the public , 133 while bargaining processes regarding the
right of the individual upon an ad hoc basis have increasingly come to replace this collective
element of the conventional infrastructure of the law as described above. This is, so to speak,
the dark side of the change of paradigms in society: the emergent “society of organisations”
tends to keep its rationality more or less invisible. Once self reflexive bargaining processes
come into place which undermine the universalistic character of the liberal legal order, and the
126
127
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borderline of the “no harm” principle 134 loses its cognitive and normative function (for
example, the attribution of personal responsibility) any interest might re-enter the procedure
of rule-making and put the bindingness of law at risk. 135
This decline is a repercussion of the emergence of a new paradigm of the legal infrastructure,
i.e., the rise of the “society of organisations”. 136 Again. the focus here is not on the
comprehensive re-construction of this new societal formation and the transformation of the
legal system which it provokes. Instead, the focus will be on the change of the societal
knowledge basis which is characterised by a split between, on the one hand, the continuity of
the self-reproduction of general experience distributed over the whole of society, and, on the
other, the advanced knowledge which is generated by the big organisations both in the
economic and the broader sense (including political parties, unions etc.). 137 This new type of
technological knowledge in particular has a far-reaching impact on the laws concerning the
protection of health and the environment, because they introduce a prospective strategy (“the
precautionary principle”, 138 “risk”, instead of experience based “danger”, the balancing of
interests in planning law, etc. 139). The differentiation of the new legal paradigm cannot be
described in detail here. 140 What is relevant for the intention of the present article is the
hypothesis that both administrative action and judicial control change considerably – an
assumption which does not rule out the continuity of the ongoing administrative practices of
the past within a basic layer of decision-making on which a new layer of operations is superimposed It is structured by more complex and more sophisticated conventions and rules, which
underlie a higher level of organised reflected observation, 141 explicit formulation and revision:
134
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135
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more and more implicit conventions which were co-ordinated and administered by large
professional associations (VDI etc.) 142 are replaced by explicit “standards” 143, and by privatepublic organised decisions (in multiple forms). 144 For the New Deal, it can be shown, as well,
that the emergence of a new type of expertise-based administration, deference to a type of
knowledge that originated from the organised processes of cognitive specialisation beyond the
general level of distributed experience, led to a reduction of judicial control which was later on
compensated 145 – once the new structure had settled and was organised by a new paradigm –
by new approaches to a closer control of procedure,146 instead of the substance of decisionmaking. This shows that the participation of private parties in the regulatory process is
inevitable 147 and legitimate, as was the case in the private generation of experience in the
“society of the individuals”.
One can summarise this evolution with the words of Noonan, Sabel and Simon 148 as a transfer
from “rule orientation” to the “formulation of plans”. This is, of course, a simplification, but it
epitomises, with good arguments, the rise of a strategic component in both public and private
decision-making: it is no longer the ideal of the continuity of the self-transformation of
experience and the stability of public order which are both observed and preserved in a caseby-case mode via individual decisions (“acte administratif”). Instead, decisions increasingly have
to be made in prospective “chains” of a plurality of actions both at the same time level (coordination of plans) and with a view to an increasingly uncertain future. This leads to more
fragmentation within administration, an evolution which finds its expression in the rise of
independent agencies in the US, in particular, or in a loosening of the inter-relationship
between the processed singular decisions: the “administrative act” loses its role of coordination among single decisions, while, at the same time, the fragmentation and the
pluralisation of the types of decision-making rises. The focus on the processing of single acts
and administrative discretion, on the one hand, and the observation and stabilisation of
internal rules and doctrinal focal points as frames of reference in the processing of decisions on

fragmentation of international environmental law: one way to deal with them consists in the reintegration of open
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142

For the evolution see Wolf, supra, note 46; Več, supra, note 46.

143

See the overview in Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 109 (2005).

144

See the contributions in INTEGRATING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE INTO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING (Christian
Joerges, Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Ellen Vos, eds., 1997).
145

Reuel Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 399 (2007).
146

See in a political science perspective Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Political Control, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW, BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION 243, 257 (1987).
147

See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 229 (2005).

148

Legal Accountability in the Service based Welfare State, Columbia Public Law Discussion Paper 08-162

28

OSGOODE CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 07 NO. 04

the other, vanishes and is replaced by the emergence of more loosely-coupled clusters149 and
patterns of strategic comprehensive decision-making. 150
The complexity of planning procedures, social insurance and social assistance, and the
supervision of technologies which developed beyond the horizon of practical communities and
led to the establishment of more professional communities of specific knowledge
(“expertise”)151 could primarily only be tackled by 0 administration itself and not by steering
laws. 152

F. SOCIETY OF NETWORKS AND THE NETWORKS OF LAW
The rise of the “society of networks”, 153 a kind of a tertiary remodelling of the “society of the
individuals” is the next step within the evolution of administration: it is characterised in the
cognitivist approach developed here by the reaction to a further rise in complexity of the
knowledge base of society. This evolution is due to the fact that the structuring capabilities of
the second order model of modern society is changed by the rise of a new mode of production
and organisation (supported by the importance of information as the principal resource of
production). The change to flat hierarchies154 and heterarchical self-organisation which process
information in a new mode generates a third layer of the organisation of postmodern society.
Technological knowledge, in particular, is no longer concentrated in stable expert communities,
but is distributed in overlapping project-oriented “epistemic communities” which combine
general and specific knowledge production in hybrid forms of communication; the primary
examples are biotechnology, and computer technology both as a basis of production of new
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See for a general theory Manuel Castells, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE.
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2011]

THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

29

information programmes and as an organisational resource in other fields of production.155
More and more hybrid modes of organisation which blend forms of the market and
organisational closure (“network contracts”)156 spread in society, and have a repercussion on
the procedures of administrative decision-making which transcend traditional borders and
stable separations. This transformation is driven by a disruptive change of information
technology and the ensuing modes of communication 157 that easily transcend the hitherto
established borderlines between organisations, organisational departments and allow, for
example, for hybrid forms of co-operation between people who remain, in one respect, strong
competitors.158
The rise of the concept of “governance” 159 as a reflection of the transformation of the
established “control projects” 160 is referred to in both the private and the public sector. For
administration, this is equivalent to an even more intense involvement in knowledge
generation processes, 161 on the one hand, and the decrease of the privileged role of the “acte
administratif” (“Verwaltungsakt”) as the “signifier 162 for the processing of the interrelationships which allow for the weaving of knowledge-generating and knowledge-stabilising
networks of decisions 163 which bind uncertainty and allow for the linkage with private
155

Michel Gensollen, Economie non rivale et communautés d’information, RÉSEAUX 141 No. 124 (2004),; id., Biens
informationnels et communautés médiatisées, 113 REVUE D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE, Special number, 8 (2003); see
also Ladeur, supra, note 146.
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157

Dirk Baecker, Systems, Network, and Culture, 15 SOZIALE SYSTEME 271, 272 (2009).
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For the trend toward network like organizations see Paul J. DiMaggio, Introduction: Making Sense of the
Contemporaray Firm and Prefiguring its Future, 3, 5, 19, in: The TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEKTIVE (id., ed., 2001).
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For the use of the concept of “governance” for a theory of administrative law in particular see Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal, 89 MINNESSOTA LAW REVIEW 263 (2004); for political science see Renate Mayntz, Governance
Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie, 11, in: GOVERNANCE-FORSCHUNG, (Gunnar Folke Schuppert, ed.,
2005); Hans-Heinrich Trute, Wolfgang Denkhaus, Doris Kühlers, Governance in der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft
37 DIE VERWALTUNG 451, 456 (2004); for the change from regulation and public “steering” of market processes to
the design of complex processes of public-private coordination; see also the contributions in: GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) and KarlHeinz Ladeur, Keyword: International Governance, Theory of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, to appear 2011.
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Harrison C. White, IDENTITY AND CONTROL. HOW SOCIAL FORMATIONS EMERGE, 2nd. ed., 220 et seq. (2008); id.,
Networks and Meaning: Styles and Switches, 13 SOZIALE SYSTEME 543 (2007); Dirk Baecker,
WIRTSCHAFTSSOZIOLOGIE 128 (2006).
161

This is why the explanation of the rise of the concept of “governance” as a repercussion of the subsumption of
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transactions. The relationship with private actors takes on an increasingly project-based
orientation because it is the private sector which controls the knowledge processes in projectrelated networks as well. “Project”, in this sense, is not equivalent to a goal-oriented process –
on the contrary, it refers more to a complex “mapping” of different co-operative ventures
which are supposed to generate a domain of action first from which specific actions and
strategies might emerge in an evolutionary way. 164 Administrative networks of co-operation165
have to be set up both within the public sphere for the knowledge accumulation and outside it,
i.e., via inter-relationships with networks of private actors. 166 This is true for the support of
technology (telecoms, high-tech) and also for the management of whatever risks which emerge
from production processes which are set up beyond the realm of the traditional experiencebased knowledge production. It should be epitomised that the basic “change agents” which
produce a new deep process of self-transformation within the legal system and its
infrastructure of social norms 167 and practices have a cognitive nature: i.e., the knowledge used
in production processes and their management underlie a disruptive change, and shatter the
paradigm of co-ordination among the different layers of the rule system of society. The rapid
transfer of knowledge enabled by information technology undermines the conceptual,
organisational, legal and practical separations upon which the legal system is based, such as the
institutional separation of the market (exchange processes) and organisation (which keep
production and management processes partially insulated from markets). The use of
sophisticated information technology allows for the establishment of hybrid co-ordination
processes which show characteristics of both hitherto separated forms of order: for example,
complex contracts on the co-ordination of firms and their suppliers make a close integration of
production processes possible without a formal integration. This is one of the phenomena of a
new network-like forms of generating order between stable organisational hierarchy and
heterarchical “loose” co-ordination via the market and contracts. A further element is to be
seen in the closer connection between technology and science in the development of high-tech
products and procedures: the established stable mode of co-ordination between general
science and specific product development undergoes a transformation which leads to a much

164

For a theoretical perspective see Patrick Schumacher, Les mécanismes de l’innovation radicale, 85
COMMUNICATIONS No. 85, 171, 180 (2009).
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See for the transnational level Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002).
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For the characteristic element of transnational cooperation among “like” administrative agencies see ead. &
David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCE 211, 215,
223 (2006).
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See also Eric A. Posner, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 4 (2000) who points out that law operates alwa against a “
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closer reciprocal interrelationship between science and technology in both directions: 168 i.e., on
the one hand, joint-ventures on research of private firms react to the rapid transfer of scientific
knowledge to product development (biotechnology). At the other extreme of the range of
possibilities, one can observe even technological processes (Nano-technology) where there is
no separation between these hitherto separated modes of knowledge and technological
interventions into nature or the structure of materials creates new realities which lie beyond
the abstract scientific observation of an outside reality. This need not be deepened here. 169 At
the middle range of technological evolution, the transformation of the network industries, in
particular, have to be mentioned: the monopolistic hierarchical development of
telecommunications services that followed a stable trajectory of technological improvement of
“big networks” 170 has been changed to a complex heterarchical opaque search process under
extreme uncertainty. 171 This development has had considerable repercussions in the
transformation of the legal structure of regulation: the state no longer claims to occupy a
privileged observing position, instead, its position has been shifted to the periphery of a
heterarchical network whose development can only be anticipated in a scenario-like mode. 172

G. THE CHANGING “SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY” OF THE LAW AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF SOCIETY
The strategic “design” of such loosely-coupled networks is only imaginable as a co-operative
venture in which the private actors have a stake themselves, because it pre-supposes the joint
constructive contributions of more actors and information brokers, 173 and includes the
necessity to set up a self-reflexive component of a knowledge management: knowledge is not a
neutral resource that can be conceived without paying attention to “social epistemology” as
should have been made plausible by the examples of the knowledge basis of the “society of the
individuals” and the “society of organisations”. 174 This reflection should have shown that the
form of networks that is - with good reasons - invoked when it comes to the description of
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OBJECTIVITY (2007).
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administrative processes beyond the frames of territoriality175 is primarily a phenomenon
which emerges from within the societal transformation of the nation states themselves. Global
administrative law is not the product of the challenge of the state-based legal structure from
outside, it is, instead, to be described as the outcome of a general shift from the paradigmatic
forms of the “society of organisations” to the “society of networks”, which has a disruptive
effect on the legal structure which found a new stability in the 1970s and 1980s of the 20th
century after a long period of experimentation. The emergence of the fragmented network
form is due to a new evolutionary transformation of the knowledge- and rule-base of society in
the broad sense sketched in this article. 176
The rise of the concept of the network 177 is a consequence of the fact that it is no longer a
stable separation between the general experience as a distributed knowledge base, on the one
hand, and the “best available” knowledge 178 produced by big firms, on the other hand, which
characterise the focal structure of the cognitive “pool of variety” but a much more
heterarchically fragmented loosely-coupled cognitive network which is at stake in
postmodernity.179 This new structure allows at the same time for more intense co-ordination
among private actors themselves and between public and private actors in a way that blurs the
hitherto-established separations that had already – if only to a limited extent – been severed by
the institutions of the “society of the organisations”. 180 The flexibility draws on the fact that the
phenomenon of the “joint venture” established by firms which still compete with each other on
the market demonstrates the potential of co-operation in new project based “epistemic
communities”. 181 This is valid both for the private and the public domain. In the realm of the
175

For the fundamental transformation and flexibilisation of „space” see Saskia Sassen, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY,
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SYSTEM (Torsten Strulik & Helmut Willke, eds., 2006); Torsten Strulik & Matthias Kussin, Finanzmarktregulierung
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latter, the state is able to co-ordinate its strategies with groups of firms in research processes
which are no longer “steered” 182 by stable technological trajectories and expectations.
Something similar goes, for example, for the co-ordination among transnational firms upon the
basis of the new Lex Mercatoria which is self-organised by private operators; however, one
should bear in mind that, in general, rather big enterprises are parties like a “club”, 183 to its
processing while conflicts among smaller firms are still judged by state courts with reference to
a generalised set of norms which have their origin in the realm of public transactions. 184
One has to admit that the cohesion of the new transnational law is (and can be) - to a much
lesser extent - stabilised by public institutions; institutions (legal norms in particular): it is more
driven by a network of dispersed strategic operations of big law firms (for transnational clients).
This is not so much a non-democratic illegitimate form of law-making but, due to the advent of
a new structural “drift” in the legal system, a phenomenon that is not new if we look back to
the emergence of preceding legal paradigms.185
Looking back on the internal self-transformation of the state-based legal system, one can - with
good reason - ask whether the ensuing fragmentation of the cognitive basis of the postmodern
society and its impact on the fragmented legal system does not challenge the role of the public
at large and its participation in legal rule-making. 186 However, one has to be aware of the fact
that, even in the liberal “society of the individuals”, the central frame of reference for the
generation of a collective order has been the spontaneously processed realm of experience and
its societal rules, upon which the formal legal system was super-imposed as the second layer of
the normative system of society. The legislator had only played a minor rule in this system as
has been shown above. Even in the “society of organisations” during its heydays in the 1970s,
the democratic “steering” potential of the state 187 could not primarily make use of legislation,
but, in the so-called “golden age”, the nation state had to draw on the pre-structuring of society
by the corporatist co-operation of the pluralistic social groups and the big firms and the
182
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183
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“representative organisations” of both. 188 This complex group-based infrastructure of the late
modern nation state has left its traces in the legal system, which was composed of both an
increasing number of laws and the regulation of more and more spheres of societal domains in
the welfare state. However, a closer look at the norms themselves make it clear that their
conception pre-supposed a moderating role of administration and in the legal system in the
proper sense a new methodology that opened itself toward the “normalising” impact of the
differentiated social spheres by reference to broad concepts which built a bridge between the
pre-structured reality and the law. A prominent example for this new methodology is the rise
“balancing”, and the “proportionality principle”: 189 both are fact ridden, in the same way as the
understanding of the major concepts of liberal law had drawn on general experience and social
norms190 as the frame of reference for the legal practice. The state-based conception of the
democratic statute 191 as the core of the legal system has always been normativistic wishful-

188

See Colin Crouch, CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND CHANGE: RECOMBINANT GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 32, 92, 101 (2005).
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political power.
190

The focus on “social agents” as the main source of legal norms (and not the state as such) goes back to Philip
Selznick, Philippe Nonet & Howard M. Vollmer, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 1969, 244.
191

In the US “democratic” legitimacy of administrative action historically was based more on the authority of the
president than democratic statutes, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and ‘The Democracy’: Administrative Law
from Jackson to Lincoln 1829-1861, 117 YALE LAW JOURNAL1568 (2008).

2011]

THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

35

thinking. 192 In this respect, no fundamental change has occurred in the postmodern society of
the networks. This common limitation of legislation by its dependence on the “framing” effects
of societal norms notwithstanding, the challenge to the legal system and its difficulties in
finding a consistent response is undeniable. The question has to be re-formulated, though, in
the sense of a search for a new role of the legal system in the stricter sense and a reformulation for the inter-relationships with the fragmented heterarchical type of looselycoupled norms generated from segmented functionally-specified networks, 193 instead of rather
stable group-based and organisation-based links between the law and the societal knowledge
base. Both the law of the society of the individuals and the pluralistic law of the society of
(representative) organisations194 were characterised by broad comprehensive cognitive “pools
of variety” which corresponded to the territorial logic of the nation state, whereas the
fragmented functionally-ordered segmented cognitive network of postmodernity lacks this
focal orientation, which implies a potential transparency, of mutual interference and coordination by common meta-rules and methods of argumentation and comparison.
The common reference to the proportionality principle both in domestic and European law is
problematical: because of its vagueness, it tends to block the adequate conceptualisation of
new challenges related to the heterogeneity of postmodern law and its concomitant “norm
collisions”. 195 It is only acceptable as a kind of “placeholder” for a new type of an emergent
norm that is generated in an experimental mode ex post from the observation of new conflicts
which cannot be solved with reference to traditional norms that are set ex ante and are
“applied” to cases. This new type of norm which is generated “bottom up” is due to the high
level of complexity of postmodern law.
The network like structure of the postmodern cognitive infrastructure is much less transparent
and not easy to integrate into a comprehensive framework. This has an impact also on the selfunderstanding of citizenship which is not obviously compatible with the loose network of
knowledge distributed not over society at large, but over differentiated webs which are not
easily accessible to individuals, 196 which take on a fragmented and self-designed character
themselves. 197
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND COURTS
A. THE CO-OPERATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF A NORM

The focus on legitimacy and the simplistic supposition of a deductive rationality of the legal
process detracts the attention from the problems of “internal autopoiesis” of law, i.e., the
requirements of maintaining the closure of the system at the micro-scale, which Luhmann
seems to neglect as well. 198 The legal system can be regarded as being composed of chains of
decisions being produced by the tribunals – this is what Luhmann calls the “centre” of the legal
system, whereas the processing of contracts and other private transactions is to be located at
the periphery. 199 In my view, this rather static internal differentiation does not give sufficient
tribute to the internal “unrest” which is continuously moving the system and which prevents its
acentric processing from coming to a halt.200 The same is true for the conception of the legal
system as composed of norms and their “application” to a case. Systems theory’s focus on
decisions and transactions comes closer to a more productive view of the internal aspect of the
self-construction of the legal system. The legal system not only has to reproduce its border lines
in order to close its rationality off from the direct interference of other systems (religion,
politics) but it also has to reproduce its unity both by the flow of “legal components” (decisions,
contracts, etc.) and by the reflection and control of the internal rationality of the interrelationships between operations: the process of decision-making or contracting cannot always
start from zero, its internal experimentation has to weave connections between operations and
to observe which patterns prove to be successful and which have to be “second guessed” in
new trial and error processes. The functional requirement to stabilise expectations under
conditions of uncertainty 201 pre-supposes not only autonomy vis-à-vis the other social systems,
but also the internal management of rules. Rules have a paradoxical character in as much as
they cannot just preserve the “given” (in this case, one does not need rules in the modern
sense), they have to allow for orientation in a society which is continuously involved in
processes of self-transformation 202 that includes the subject himself or herself, who “fulfils the
mysterious function of association lived experience of the individual with a communicable and
198

This seems true in spite of the fact that Luhmann takes into consideration that law is dependent on cases and is
in search of a kind of “’local’ rationality” alone, Niklas Luhmann, supra, note 40, 352..
199
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Atlan, L’émergence du nouveau et du sens, 115, 122, in: L’AUTO-ORGANISATION. DE LA PYSIQUE AU POLITIQUE
(PAUL DUMOUCHEL & JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY, 1983): “random perturbations” may be self-reinforced and provoke
the emergence of a new paradigm of “order from noise”.
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social form of expression”. 203 The rule has to be continuously re-worked and re-modelled 204 by
both new judgments and new operations as well as the generation of new patterns of public
and private decision-making 205 in order to be able to allow for co-ordination among individuals
or other legal persons who have to struggle with the dynamics of self-transformation of society.
This is why precedents (decisions) or patterns of contracting and a certain stability of
expression guaranteed by referring to patterns of behaviour have to be reproduced by the legal
system. The paradox of the decision is expressed quite convincingly by Russell Hardin, who
takes the view that, in common law – not only there – the individual court decision is meant to
produce a new rule for third persons, while the present litigants are simultaneously treated as
though the rule had been in place when they acted”. 206 This includes the “docility” of the legal
actors who have to adapt themselves to both factual and legal standards of behaviour.207
Against the background of these general assumptions, the concept of “network” may be helpful
for the conceptualisation of the internal rationality of the legal system: this concept presupposes a complex infrastructure of the legal system and its internal inter-relationships which
are managed and re-arranged by different forms of feedback loops.208 The feedback loops reinforce the connections between a cluster of operations which aggregate a “hub” and
reproduce the closure of patterns of behaviour or a second order reflexive concept based upon
the observation and justification of a pattern. At the same time, the network of patterned
operations reproduces differentiation i. e., the separation between a pattern and a set of
“exceptions” which are loosely-coupled with the pattern as a default mechanism which exerts a
certain attraction on the acceptability of a certain construction, interpretation or
argumentation in a legal process: 209 for example, the freedom of a contract can, of course,
always be called into question because “freedom” is a vague concept, but, in a traditional legal
understanding, the possibility of bringing in this argument is kept separate from the pattern of
normal contracting and restricted to invocation of mental illness, error, breach of boni mores,
etc. This is not necessarily the case: the “hub which reproduces the pattern of a normal
contract can be re-opened and the “structural hole”, as network analysis might put the
relationship between the stabilised “hub” and the weaker node of exceptional operations
203
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DU SENS COMMUN (Claude Gauthier & Sandra Laugier, eds., 2009.
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which are kept separate in a smaller “hub”, can be overcome by introducing new types of
“weak” individuals for whom the pattern is modified (consumers, dependent workers and
employees, etc). A new mode of overcoming this structural hole in private law is the reference
to the constitution, i.e., an analogy is drawn between a private law operation and the
infringement of a constitutional right by the state. 210 This re-opens the internal closure which
was established in the past and demands new forms of closure which limit this interrelationship in order to allow for stability within. The example shows that a completely
patternless openness of the legal system to arguments would block the internal autopoiesis
even if the outer autopoiesis was not at stake, because it could just be an orientation crisis of
the legal system and not a case of interference of a different social system.
The past and present status of administrative law is not a creation of judges. Law in the
administrative system is to be understood primarily as a self-generated set of rules by
administrative deciders, which is controlled or shaped by the legislator or judges only after the
fact. 211 Judicial review can only be “sporadic and peripheral”.212 A different picture would lead
to “institutional blindness” 213 and ignorance of the creative and experimental function of
administrators themselves and of the “wider conception of administrative justice” that includes
the impact of the eigenrationality of administrative practices. 214 It would also overtax the unity
of administrative law. 215
It is not by chance that, in Germany, the general rules of administrative procedure have only
been codified in 1976. 216 The above-mentioned complex processes enacted by the
administration of the “society of organisations” have also been tackled at first by the
administrative agencies themselves and have only been the object of vague laws which draw on
the experience of administrators later on. Administrative law emerges from the
indetermination of a process which draws on the decision as that which creates new
experimental “bindingness” from situation to situation - in a society which is no longer based
210

See the comparative contributions in: EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM (Georg Nolte, ed., 2005).

211

Thomas Poole, The Reformation of English Administrative Law, 68 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 142, 155 (2009)
156; Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW REVIEW 497, 520 (2005); id. supra, note 7, at 1378.
212

Poole, ibid. 157.

213

See generally Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (2006).
214

Poole, ibid., 164, 167.

215

Poole, ibid., 165.

216

This is very similar to the evolution of American administrative law: the APA has mainly codified administrative
practices, see Mashaw, supra, note 7;; for the political constellation that made possible the APA as a reaction to
the New Deal see McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra , note 146..
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upon the illusion of being able to reproduce a tradition - and not as deduced from a stable
norm. 217
This development, which was very similar in other countries such as France, UK, USA, is
summarised by B. Kingsbury218 in the assumption that judges have, over time, been able to
construct a system of administrative law without comprehensive specification in statutes or
constitutional norms. The second part of this observation concerning the reduced involvement
of the legislators is certainly correct. With the first part concerning judges, one might have
difficulties, at least, as far as the “construction” of a system of administrative law is concerned.
The main instrument of administrative law in France and Germany, the “administrative act”,
has long been regarded as a remnant of the absolutist state. However, as was remarked earlier,
this is a one-sided observation: this institution has been completely remodelled and been
adapted to the conditions of the liberal state and society: it allows for objectivation, selfcontinuation, learning and transparency. 219 However, it remains a construction of
administration; it has been recognised, structured and formalised by the judiciary. To call this
“judge-made law” 220 is somewhat superficial, because it is more a product of a coupling
between the networks of administration and the processing of a network of the judges which
introduced stability (for the rights of individuals in particular) and specific rules for validity etc.,
into the administration law, although a major part of the rules relate to practices which have
been generated by the administration itself. This true, in particular, for the broad range of
administrative operations which are mainly self-referential, in the sense that the direct contact
to the rights of the citizens is reduced or regarded as non-existent. In Germany, this is the world
of the “special power relationships” (“besonderes Gewaltverhältnis”) dominating public schools,
military service, the status of civil servants and “public assistance”, which implied a specific
dynamic status allowing for administrative “creation”, as opposed to public services provided
by the state (such as the telephone, water, electricity, etc.) or local agencies, which could be
the object of a special public law regime but did not impose a status of continuous regulation.
The claim to preserve a continuity of public order by administrative decision-making
(administrative acts in particular) involved a leeway of discretion because rights were regarded
from the outset as being inherently limited by the rights of others and the comprehensive
“general interest”.221 Notwithstanding this, this general interest was no longer that of the state,
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exception see Albert Ogien, LES RÈGLES DE LA PRATIQUE SOCIOLOGIQUE 109 (2007); Christiane Chauviré, PEIRCE
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but of the “order” of society at large, which included - as mentioned before - continuous
change. 222
This phenomenon does not differ much from the relationship between private law in a stricter
sense and the practical networks of experience which process the cognitive infrastructure of
the law.
This is what is at stake when N. Luhmann 223 regards “decisions” as the operation which is
characteristic for the autopoietic process of reproduction of the legal system. One should go
one step further and expand more on the idea of network as the infrastructure of the legal
system. Luhmann himself also refers to the idea of network, but does not give much detail on
what he means when referring to the phenomena of “networks” in the legal system. 224 The
shift from the hierarchical perspective on the legal norm as the steering element of the process
of setting up the internal autopoietic structure of the legal system, to a heterarchical
conception of the development based upon a processing of decisions not just from case-to-case
but as a kind of management of inter-relationships and connection possibilities within a
network of decisions, 225 contracts and, above all, judgments might be more adequate as the
reference to norms or “principles” as the “open source” of the legal system. Legal principles
should not be regarded as being based upon the “nature of things” (G. Del Vecchio) or an
abstract set of meta-rules for the generation and completion of norms, or their adaptation to
specific cases. Instead, they are to be conceptualised as reflexive general experiences drawn
from a vast amount of cases 226 and linked to practices of legal decision-making. They have a
distributed character themselves, in as much as they are processed within the networks as
recurring patterns of the management of the inter-relationships and constraints which have
been accumulated in the legal system.227 The autonomy of the legal system is not equivalent to
being insulated from moral values, politics, economic interests, etc. Its autopoiesis consists,
instead, in sustaining an impersonal “network of networks” of inter-relationships which
generate patterns of operations, institutional constraints and beliefs (including the possibility of
forming expectations and longer chains of actions) so as to make learning as a means of coping
with uncertainty both possible and attractive. The autonomy of the legal system is a response

222

Powell, supra, note 73.
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Luhmann, supra, note 198, 46, 78, 98, and passim.
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to the “essential incompleteness” (“inachèvement essentiel” 228) of both individuals and society,
which makes institutions the “engines of history” which retain a productive “pool of variety” of
operations that shape change by imposing constraints,229 and allow for an impersonal
monitoring upon the basis of a systemic memory. This distributed memory which is processed
by the complex “network of networks” of cases and the internal rules on the reflection of interrelationships between cases and decisions allows for the “invention” of that which is not given
a priori 230 and generates new structured “regular” action potentials which, at the same time,
open a perspective for co-operation, co-ordination, and repetition. Order cannot be generated
from a privileged rational totalising view on society from “outside”; in a civil society, it is the
emergent property of individual and organised productive operations with and within chaos,231
which is retained and structured by an institutionalised memory beyond the individual.

B. THE NEW ROLE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL IN POSTMODERN SOCIETIES
As has been shown in this article, the breaks of symmetry in the technological system which
challenge the network structure within the legal system are not managed by the legislator first,
and are then broken down to a new practice of decision-making in the legal system. On the
contrary, the constant flux of operations in the networks within the legal system and the
exchange processes with the knowledge-producing networks outside are themselves the
“agents of change”. 232 Apparently, the recent evolutionary transformations of administrative
law are not well-reflected in legal theory, which tries to meet the challenge of complexity by
new holistic approaches which abandon conceptual and doctrinal analysis of the change
process.
German administrative law has been superseded in the last decades by a tendency to establish
a monistic approach focused on rights233 and the proportionality principle. 234 Interestingly, the
same has been said recently about English administrative law, after the introduction of the
European human rights into the English legal system. 235 This is a reductionist perspective that
228

Gauthier, supra, note 80, 242.

229

North et al. , supra, note 60, 261; Greif, supra, note 98, 380.

230
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232

See also the approach developed by Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1413, who also concentrates on practices of
administrative agencies and not primarily its justification.
233

The same can be said for constitutional law; this seems to be a general tendency in western law, see Mark V.
Tushnet, The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century, 377, in: THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA,
Vol. 3, 337 et seq. (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008), (arguing that the concept of rights is
shifting towards a broader understanding of the protection of “autonomy”).
234
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See the references supra, note 189.

Poole, supra, note 211, 155; see also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 437 (2003), who identifies different paradigms in American administrative
law.
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ignores the complexity of the administrative tasks that cannot be accessed by a focus on the
individual rights which are at stake in a decision-making process.
In global administrative law which is, in many respects, much more dependent on legitimation
by state law in the stricter sense that the protagonists of a new look at a transnational legal
sphere beyond the state tend to refer to general principles of law 236 as – if not a source of
legitimation – a limiting constraint, on the one hand, which serves as a legitimation basis, on
the other hand. The role of these general principles remains rather unclear 237 in modern legal
theory, whereas, in more traditional approaches, the possibility of the deduction of such
principles from the “nature of things” 238 is focused in a way which is no longer plausible today.
This construction is another version of the ignorance of the necessary responsive cumulative
mode of law-making inherent in administrative processes of decision-making. 239
The recent evolution of new complex types of procedure and decision-making has had a strong
impact on the coordination of administrative and judicial decision-making (and on the
legislator, as well). Reference to the more structured and reflexive types of knowledge needs
more procedural rules which re-construct the informational infrastructure of complex decisionmaking processes,240 instead of the more substantive, rule-based type of decision of the society
of the individuals of the past. It should be born in mind that “rule-based”, in the sense intended
here includes all the layers or the normative and cognitive rules and conventions which are
processed by reference to the individual right in the “private law society” and the single
“administrative acts” of public administration which follow a similar logic, despite the seemingly
sharp difference between public and private law. A similar evolution can be observed in private
law, as well. This is, above all, true for tort law and liability for negligence, in particular.
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Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 JOURNAL OF WORLD
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With reference to court practice, the co-ordination between administration and judicial control
becomes much more complex, 241 as well. Whereas judicial control of administrative acts in the
“society of individuals” could be focused on the doctrinal construction, variation and
preservation of rules and mediating doctrinal inter-relationships between cases and decisions,
judicial control of the administrative decision-making in the “society of networks” is much more
complicated: one could re-conceive it more as a “web” or a network of judgments which
revolve around a cluster of cases, 242 and process information and orientation to administration
in a more diffuse way. 243 This evolution can lead to a more politicised control,244 both in a
positive sense as an attempt by courts to set the substantive standards under conditions of
uncertainty, or in the negative sense of leaving more room to administrative discretion, or it
has to be re-considered and re-framed in a new way. As in the past,245 however, the steering
function of the law and of the statutes, in particular, should not be over-estimated: 246 the
deliberation of this question should not be focused in a one-sided way on the legislator –
assuming a delegation of discretion enshrined in a statute where no such thing is to be found.
Instead, a parallel should be drawn to the relationship between the law and its cognitive
infrastructure in the “society of individuals”: administration can no longer be oriented by the
distributed sets of experience; instead, it draws on a multiplicity of self-organised societal
knowledge types including self-generated “best practices”, 247 which stand for the innovative
dimension of experimental future-oriented administrative action under conditions of
uncertainty. 248
241
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The focus of control should as a consequence shift to a more network like mode, i.e., the rules
for administrative decision-making in complex domains, planning law, environmental 249 or hightechnology law, or other types of strategic goal-oriented ways which comprise chains and
networks of operations. The frame of reference for judicial control cannot be stable
conceptions of the norm, individual rights, experience or doctrinal concepts, but, instead, the
administrative decision-making process has to be formulated in a more comprehensive open
way with a view to the limitations set by the challenge of action under conditions of
uncertainty. As a consequence, the “control-project” 250 should also be formulated in a more
open way, which is focused more on the outside observation (with a view to administration) of
the plurality of network like inter-relationships between the different steps of the decisionmaking process on the one hand, and the potential concatenation of several decisions on the
same time-scale and with a view to potential future administrative operations. This means that,
instead of the orientation on the “substantive rationality” 251 of rules whose structures and
goals can, more or less clearly, be pre-supposed, the “procedural rationality” of both the
distributed network of administrative 252 and the judicial decisions should be considered with
regard to the learning of new practices. 253 With Dorf & Sabel, one could talk about distributed
practices of “experimentalism”, 254 which as I would like to add, replace or supplement
249
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250
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251
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distributed experience as a core element of the infrastructure of the law. The relationship
between administration and judicial control could be phrased as “ tangled web”, 255 instead of
as a stable rule-orientation, as might seem adequate for the “society of the individuals”. As
Joanne Scott and Susan P. Sturm 256 have luckily formulated, one might regard the role of the
judiciary in this tangled web of decisions somewhat as a “catalyst” which functions as
“enabling”, blocking or setting conditions of new actions under conditions of uncertainty, and
uses the interference in the administrative process rather as a monitoring function thereby
strengthening the internal rationality and transparency 257 of the informational process and the
learning capabilities in the future.258 At the same time, the judicial system should consider
whether its own learning capabilities can be improved and stabilised by considering the
productive concatenation of a new judgment with the requirements formulated in former
decisions, and with a potential new judgment the future. In the analysis of judicial decisionmaking, reference has already been made to the distributed rationality of a network of
judgments which have to be read in a horizontal heterarchical mode of processing from case to
case. 259 This approach should not be read as a support for individualised situative decisionmaking, not at all. There has to be a flexible concatenation which allows for the creation of
reflexive web of “similar” judgments that tries to learn from the practical response of actors to
its previous “entries” in the network of judgments. This institutional arrangement is a kind of
“judicial polycentricity” 260 that corresponds to the polycentric processing of markets and its

(2008); ; on the responsibility of transnational governance networks see James Bohman, DEMOCRACY ACROSS
BORDERS. FROM DÊMOS TO DÊMOI, 2010, 44 seq.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global
Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 121, in: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
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(2007).
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administrative observation and limitation 261 (in the past with the help of the “actes
administratifs” in particular).
The network based approach 262 developed here would assume that there is also a process of
coupling between the practical networks of administrative decision-making and the private
processes of contracting or arguing about the limits of rights (damage, negligence, etc.263) on
the one hand, and the networks of court judgments which have to cope with the internal
requirements of preserving consistency and the external requirement of keeping the practical
networks of administration and private actors (in private law) productive and dynamic – this
includes the respect for private autonomy in private law and discretion in public law, on the
other. Robert Cover has regarded “jurisdictional redundancy” as a flexible strategy of avoiding
errors. 264 This idea is not to be confined to the plurality of courts in federal systems alone, but it
should include the polycentric web of judgments that try to generate and manage the “density
of experience”. 265 Methodological “dissensus” 266 can also be regarded as a productive element
in a more experimental search for new rules and patterns of co-ordination in both private an
public law as long as a web-like structure of mutual reference, reflection, and revision is
preserved with a view to the proactive generation of a common frame of judgment that loosely
integrates a practice which is taken seriously.

C. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE NETWORK LIKE STRUCTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL COURT PRACTICE
IN THE FIELD OF (PRIVATE) MEDIA LAW IN PARTICULAR
A closer look at Lex Mercatoria or the other private legal regimes shows that they have formed
a new legal order for a network of (regular) participants, transnational economic and legal
transactions in particular, 267 which does not cover the whole of the arena of transnational
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exchange. 268 The bearers of this network of law are (in private law) big firms, which
continuously engage in an exchange of roles (they act both as sellers/providers and as buyers).
This engagement is the basis for the emergence of common interests which are shared by
transnational corporate actors in particular. At the other end of the range of action formats in
transnational affairs, we must not forget the smaller- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) which
only rarely engage in transnational transactions or the role of consumers. In this field,
transnational contracts are still judged in cases of conflict by state courts. And it seems to be far
from simple to develop a homogeneous stable court practice even upon the basis of a uniform
legal text such as the Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG) 269 and in spite of a duty
imposed on courts to consider the common interest in a homogeneous legal practice.270 The
networking271 in this latter case is done by courts and not by the participants in transactional
legal affairs, as in the field of Lex Mercatoria. This seems to be a common denominator which
might be productive in conceptualising global law – public and private: The emergence of a
global type of law “beyond the state” pre-supposes a network based common interest of
participants, 272 which is not identical with the public interest of an overarching community. This
does not, from the outset, speak against the recognition of a new type of global law – far from
it. It should, perhaps, warn us not to regard this phenomenon as just a transitory momentum
which, in the long run, ends up in the “constitutionalised” world society. 273 It would be
268
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preferable to distinguish more reflexive mechanisms in the practice of self-organised rules,
which would – following the conception of the inter-relationship between law and different
forms of social convention –include also rules of a practice which implicitly also formulate
considerations about the balancing of competing interests of parties which are not involved in
the network itself.
This is the case, for example, in the media, which continuously experiment with new formats of
a construction of reality as they have to observe not only “reality”, but also the selftransformation of the “identity” of the recipients themselves. 274 According to a more collective
societal (and not only individualistic) understanding of civil rights, the freedom of the press, in
particular, also comprises the autonomy of the press as a societal institution with the
consequence that it implies the freedom to formulate and modulate conceptions of the public
interest and modes of its “formatting”.275 At the same time, this implies a distributed tentative
mode of considering competing interests such as the privacy of media stars and politicians.276
The role of courts should protect these rights, of course, but, at the same time, this implies a
respect for the whole network of media communication and the logic of its functioning: the
protection of conflicting rights should be fine-tuned to the rules and conventions of the media
and not ignore its autonomy also with regard to the re-formulation of its understanding of, for
example, what the public realm is (European Court of Human Rights, ECHR). 277 This means that
the constraints set by competing rights have to be formulated by courts, instead from a
heterarchical point of observation which would be focused on “re-entering” a constraint into
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 529 (1998); id.,
‚We the Peoples of the United Nations’: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form in International Law, 269, in:
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Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247, 253
(2006); Esty, supra, note 125, 1490; for a differentiated view cf. also Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without
the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
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the network for a re-modelling which bears in mind the procedural rationality which epitomises
the rules and requirements of processing information under conditions of uncertainty278 and
not to be blinded by traditional substantive rule orientation.279 This means that courts, instead,
fulfil the role of oversight which should try to irritate the self-organisational potential of the
media network in order to broaden the productive range of possibilities of reaction of the
media system and not focus on a case-to-case-based substantial rationality of stable rules.280
The same is true for other private net-based communication such as the ebay 281 valuation
system, or ICANN,282 a system with its own private formal organisation which also has to find a
balance between conflicting rights and interests. These examples could be counted as versions
of self-organisation which need a certain public oversight because of the involvement of
outsiders who cannot participate in the process of generating self-organised rules.283 This is not
so unusual if one considers even the traditional experience-based rules, which courts refer to
when deciding on “negligence” 284 or the preservation of the public order. The only major
difference is to be seen in the fact that experience is more or less a spontaneously generated
set of practical rules which has developed only a thin institutional layer in some fields
(associations of engineers, etc.), whereas, in the case of a differentiated self-reflexive potential
278
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of observation and revision of rules of practice to be followed by big firms (even below the level
of formalisation in explicit standards 285), the court has to consider the strategic effects of its
decision-making practice in the search processes of the incumbent firms (duties to warn). These
remarks should have demonstrated that private self-organisation and public oversight are not
mutually exclusive. Law-making has always been process-driven, the institutionalised stable
component used to be nested with the societal knowledge basis and with strategic action taken
by legal practitioners. 286

D. AFTER THE EXPERIMENTAL CREATION
ADMINISTRATION…WHAT? THE CODIFICATION?

OF

NEW

COOPERATIVE

FORMS

OF

The recent evolution of more complex administrative processes has raised interest in the
internal procedures of generating information, knowledge, and evaluation of alternatives,
etc., 287 within the administration, which are no longer obvious, as was the case in the past.
Administrative procedures of information as a side-effect of the increasing complexity of
decision-making informal procedures288 of knowledge generation and forms of public- private
co-operation 289 (including contracting290) have been developed – again from within the
administration.291 Approaches to establish a legal structure for this version of “co-operative
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See the contributions in: MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (Gerd Winter, ed.,
2006); Martin Herberg, GLOBALISIERUNG UND PRIVATE SELBSTREGULIERUNG: UMWELTSCHUTZ IN
MULTINATIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN (2007); also the contributions in: RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS. SELF-GOVERNANCE
AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter, eds.,
2008), in particular Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self Governance through Global Product Certification Chains,
ibid., 259.
286

Quack, supra, note 185, 643, 644.

287

Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1749 (2007)
(emphasizing the role of courts to create acceptable rules for administrative agencies); for a critique that
emphasizes the role of courts in the protection of rights as opposed to public policies see McNollgast & Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Administrative Law Agonists, 108 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, SIDEBAR 2008; see generally Stuart Shapiro
& David Guston, Procedural Control of the Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic Drift, 17 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH & THEORY 535 (2007); (underlining the dependency of conceptions of administrative
control on the transformation of “embodied” knowledge).
288

See for the difficulties to fit informal action into traditional legal administrative formats Kersten & Lenski, supra,
note 9, 521.
289

See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2006).
290

See only Andreas Abegg, Die Vertragsfreiheit der Verwaltung – Verwaltungsverträge im Schatten des Rechts,
128 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 387 (2009).
291

This development concept is related to the rise of the “governance”, Lobel, supra, note 159.

2011]

THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

51

administration” 292 have failed hitherto. This is symptomatic for the relationship between the
legislator and the administration: the major instruments of administrative action as such are
beyond the reach of general regulation. This is due to the fact that the relationships between
“public” and “private” 293 always contain an element of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: what is
accepted as “regarding all” is an emergent property of entangled processes of the observation
of practices and of paradigmatic settlements that are dependent on experiment. They can only
be controlled on a case-to-case basis by the judges. The legislative form of rule-making is only
compatible with administrative action if the networks of decision-making have developed
contours – especially upon the basis of conflicting legal interests, subjective rights in particular.
Notwithstanding this, this constellation is accessible only to a limited re-structuring by the
legislator, which leaves enough potential for the shaping of different cases and the
experimentation with different patterns of the management of inter-relationships.
The reflection on the evolution of modern law and its transformation during the 20th century
have demonstrated the importance of the cognitive infrastructure of legal practice which has
changed considerably, not only with regard to the character of the knowledge base itself upon
which legal decision-making depends continuously. The law is not just super-imposed upon a
cognitive base which allows it to be specified case-by-case, but the inter-relationship of both
the cognitive and the normative layer of the law is not a passive one. The exchange is prestructured by secondary normalising meta-rules which stabilise the regularity of the process of
reproduction of the “pool of variety” for different types of practices, and, at the same time, the
law itself develops its own set of internal rules of interpretation, of estimating probabilities,
proof rules in cases of non liquet, rules of presumption, of co-ordinating societal conventions
and the legal rules in particular.294 In addition to this, there is an intermediate layer in which
the role of the producers of the knowledge base is institutionalised (from public distributed
knowledge accumulation) via organised reproduction in big firms towards postmodern
network-like “epistemic communities” which provoke a fragmentation of the knowledge
production. This transformation finds its repercussion in the shifting focus of the generation of
292
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“order”: from substantive rationality which supports the reproduction of rules to the
management of conflicting group- and organisation-based knowledge by principles of balancing
and the respect of proportionality – which are both open to the valuation of factual interests
and positions – and finally the emergence of proceduralisation, 295 which consists of an
increasing importance of the proactive stimulation of the process of generation of knowledge in
private and public networks. This change ends in a process of fragmentation of different arenas
and allows only a loose mode of coupling between the differentiated networks by broad rules
which are oriented at the open co-ordination of the tangled web of the law within a complex
“network of networks”. One should epitomise that the emergence of the “networks of law” in
the postmodern society develops more and more different arenas for the construction of order
in which the combination of cognitive and normative rules varies to a considerable extent. The
close co-ordination in fragmented networks excludes outsiders, while, at the same time, the
complexity and future orientation of the postmodern law reduces the protection granted in
former times by “rights” 296 because their frame of reference was, in the past (liberal society),
also pre-structured by the general limitations imposed on subjective rights by other holders of
rights: if the differentiation of the networks of operators increases, this will also change the
general and universal frame of reference for the definition of the rules of co-ordination of rights
of different subjects. At the same time, this evolution is - for the same reason - a challenge for
the state, which loses its general frame of reference itself. The rules of co-ordination within the
emerging “network of networks” of the law, which is much more loosely coupled than in the
past, have not found their contours yet. This is why theoretical positions that question the legal
character of the new self-organised norms which emerge in the differentiated range of rules
that is characteristic of the postmodern normative “network of networks” miss the point: the
increasing complexity of the cognitive embeddedness of legal norms demands a higher level of
reflexivity of their mutual inter-dependence; a new constructive and selective dimension with
regard to the fragmented cognitive rules and the construction of a whole domain of options
(instead of the experimentation on a stable trajectory laid out by experience or the corporatist
consensus based rules) has to be modelled. This is why the “internal” cognitive preparation of
the administrative decision-making processes, which was more or less negligible in the
outcome-oriented administrative law of the “society of individuals” has to be attributed
normative character in different forms. This goes for administrative rule-making in the US,
which uses “notice and comment”-procedures297 for the set up of enforcement rules which can
no longer be derived from the law or be pre-supposed as the product of internal
(administrative) or external (social) experience – for example, with regard to the societal
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approach to “danger”.298 This is also the reason why more and more interests are transformed
into rights to be heard, and to be protected from private or public interference below the level
of the classical conception of “infringement” and “harm”.299
This is a problematical side-effect of the fragmentation of the “networks of the law”, 300 which
leads to a phenomenon which Sean Farhang 301 has called the “litigation state”: the courts are
involved in a much more intense mode in the process of enforcement of legal norms.302 This is
why the procedure and the reflection of the “internal” side of administration necessarily get a
new normative dimension. The focus on the “publicness” of rules, or the search for a secondary
layer of control of primary rules in the sense of H.L.A. Hart, 303 misses this point, and it also
transcends the horizon of H.L.A. Hart’s conception of law. This increasing importance of the
“internal side” of the processing of decision-making can also be observed in private law.
Michael Power, in particular, has drawn our attention to this phenomenon: the rise of “risk” as
a challenge has found its repercussion in the “precautionary principle”, 304 which is not limited
to the environmental law, but finds a parallel, for example, in financial market regulation where
“negligence” and the liability have shown to be insufficient for the management of complex
risks. This reflexivity of both private and public law beyond the classical limits of “rights”, on the
one hand, and stable behaviour-oriented norms, on the other, leads to a transformation of
normativity in postmodernity. The traditional criteria for the definition of law, as opposed to
factual rules, are no longer adequate for the observation of the dynamic of a fragmented selfreflexive legal system that necessarily expands the field of relevance and includes the
procedural rules of construction of administrative decisions.
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This development finds a correspondence in the increasing internal fragmentation of the
private firm and the decline of the traditional hierarchical “control project”, i.e., the rise of
heterarchical versions of intra-organisational distribution of competencies. It is reflected in the
overarching establishment of public control of the internal processes of knowledge generation
within companies. 305

V. OUTLOOK
The paper has tried to show that the evolution of administrative law is characterised by periods
of creative construction of new forms, instruments and procedures of administrative law in the
administrative decision-making procedures. Court control of these processes should not be
interpreted as being the only legal source of administrative law (“judge made law”) before the
partial codification of general administrative law could be brought about in Europe and the US.
If one bears this evolution in mind, it comes as no surprise that the new hybrid postmodern
forms of decision-making in both domestic and global public-private networks cannot easily be
subsumed under established administrative rules because the experimentation with, and the
search for, new forms and procedures of transnational decision-making has not yet come to a
conclusion. This constellation is not new in the evolution of administrative law, and it cannot be
reduced to the process of globalisation alone: 306 it is one of the phenomena of the emergence
of a new paradigm of (administrative) law: the law of the “network society”. 307
This process demonstrates that also global administrative law cannot be conceived as a mere
challenge to the sovereign nation state and the permeability of its territorial borders. Its
evolution is a consequence of a deeper transformation of both the economic system and the
nation state. As has been demonstrated, the central components of the classical liberal legal
system were dependent on stable concepts of property and the territory and their paradigmatic
role. The evolution of administration and the economic system is characterised by the rise of
the information and of knowledge as the main resource and frame of reference for decisionmaking. The dynamic of the postmodern “knowledge society” is at the bottom of the rapid selftranscendence of the environment of the legal system. Not only the territorial borders of the
state, but also the traditional conceptual and institutional separations on which administrative
law was founded have been severed.
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As a consequence both for the domestic layer of administrative law and the emerging global
administrative law, new forms, procedures and meta-rules for an administration beyond the
nation state have to be designed. 308 Considering the dynamic nature of the administration in,
and of, networks, more evaluation 309 ex post and more indirect rule-making will be necessary:
“steering” administrative practice ex ante by statutes or by the “application” of informal rules
of experience will not be sufficient. The new knowledge base of the “society of networks” will
allow for more self-organised rules and patterns, while, at the same time, the decreasing
relevance of stable norms in both senses should lead to a focus on procedural norms which are
designed with regard to the generation of new knowledge that will be useful for the evaluation
ex post.
We are still in the process of experimentation which will generate new forms of action, new
procedures, new types of co-ordination between public and private actors. It may well be the
case that the role of the judiciary in this new evolutionary process will be negligible, not to
mention codification by the legislator. What should be conceivable is a new type of cooperation between domestic agencies and the legislator, with the prospect of coupling
transnational procedures of decision-making and domestic legitimation and accountability of
decision-makers. 310 New elements of an inter-twinement of domestic and transnational law
might be developing. 311
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